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III.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
Petitioner, Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company ("EPCO"), submits this Brief

in Petition for review of the court of appeals decision reached in Ellsworth Paulsen
Construct, v. 51-SPR, L.L.C., 144P.3d261 (Utah App. 2006) (hereinafterEllsworth) which
case is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." This Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the
case pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 51, on December 14, 2006.
IV.

V.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL
A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY HOLDING THAT, EVEN WHERE
THE OTHER FOUR ELEMENTS OF A JOINT VENTURE ARE PRESENT,
THE LOSS-SHARING ELEMENT OF A JOINT VENTURE IS A FACT
QUESTION THAT CAN NOT BE DECIDED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

B.

THE MARDANLOU STANDARD FOR FINDING A JOINT VENTURE
SETS FORTH THE CORRECT STANDARD, AND THE ELLSWORTH
STANDARD FOR FINDING A JOINT VENTURE IS FATALLY FLAWED.

C.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE
BASIS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN IT
HELD THAT INTERNAL LOSS-ALLOCATING (NOT LOSS-SHARING)
TERMS WITHIN THE AGREEMENT GAVE RISE TO A FACT
QUESTION.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL
A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE ABUSIVE
LIEN STATUTE IS NOT A STRICT LIABILITY STATUTE

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE
LANGUAGE "MORE THAN IS DUE" APPEARING IN THE ABUSIVE
STATUTE IS MET WHERE THERE IS A CONTRACTUAL BASIS FOR
THE CLAIM OF LIEN

I

Standard of Review
All of the forgoing issues arise out of a partial summary judgment granted by Judge
Anthony W. Schofield at the trial court level. As such, holdings on summary judgment are
questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235
(Utah 2002). A statute is also involved both in the appeal and in the cross-appeal, and
interpretations of statutes are reviewed for correctness. Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc.,
935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997).
VI.

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, 269 P.2d 845 (Utah 1954); Cutler v. Bowen, 543

P.2d 1349 (Utah 1975); and Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-4.
VII.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
51-SPR- L.L.C. ("51-SPR") and Broadstone Investments, L.L.C. ("Broadstone")

formed a joint venture to develop two commercial office buildings in American Fork, Utah.
Broadstone, acting as an undisclosed partner of 51-SPR, hired Ellsworth Paulsen
Construction Company ("EPCO") as the general contractor for the project. The partnership
began to unravel after 51 -SPR accused Broadstone of diverting partnership assets in the form
of construction loan proceeds. Just as the building projects were completed by EPCO, 51SPR surfaced for the first time as the owner of the project when it kicked Broadstone out of
the partnership and took complete control of the project. Broadstone's owner allegedly fled

2

to Hawaii, leaving Broadstone without assets, and default judgments were entered against
it in favor of both EPCO and 51-SPR. Despite now receiving tens of thousands of dollars
in rental income, and selling one of the buildings at an enormous profit, 51-SPR repudiated
any obligation to pay over $800,000 of the construction costs for the project. EPCO and its
subcontractors responded by filing liens on the project.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below:
51-SPR filed suit to quiet title in the property. EPCO and the lien claimants were
named in 51-SPR's suit, and EPCO and others filed separate suits. The actions were
consolidated, and the litigation centered on the breach of contract and lien foreclosure claims.
After extensive discovery, EPCO brought a motion for summary judgment on the joint
venture liability/breach of contract claim. The summary judgment was predicated upon an
extensive and detailed development/joint venture agreement between Broadstone and 51SPR, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit " B." 51-SPR never suggested that the
agreement was anything other than fully integrated, nor did it contend that it was ambiguous.
Indeed, in opposing the summary judgment, 51-SPR tacitly conceded that the first four
elements of a joint venture were manifestly present in the agreement, i.e., community of
interest, common purpose, joint control, and a sharing ot profits. However, 51 -SPR argued
that the agreement's silence on the subject of loss sharing rendered 51-SPR merely an
investor, owing nothing to EPCO for construction costs.
On December 31, 2002, Judge Anthony W. Schofield granted EPCO's summary

3

judgment motion. A copy of that Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "C." Judge Schofield
noted that so pervasive was the control1 and outright domination of Broadstone by 51-SPR,
that the court might have found that Broadstone was not a partner at all, but merely the agent
of 51-SPR as an undisclosed principal. Summary Judgment Order, Exhibit "C," p. 12. As
to the sharing of losses element, the trial court correctly noted that the sharing of losses is
inferred by operation of law by reason of the fact that when 51-SPR put in $2.9 million of
its own money to purchase the property, took joint tenancy in the property with all of its
attendant liabilities, and guarantied the $4.3 million construction loan to construct the
buildings,2 these actions comprised the very definition of partnership loss sharing, and the
silence of the agreement on that subject has no bearing on the analysis. Summary Judgment
Order, Exhibit "C."
Despite having its liability determined on the contract claims, 51-SPR continued to
litigate the lien claims both with EPCO and its subcontractors.

Eventually, the

subcontractors' motions for summary judgment on their lien claims were granted by Judge
1

For example, the agreement contained verbiage to the effect that Broadstone as a
company was pledged to 51-SPR, and Broadstone's interest in the property was
subordinated to 51-SPR's interest to secure the funds contributed by 51-SPR. The
agreement rurther provided that Broadstone would provide monthly reports to 51-SPR,
but that 51-SPR retained the right to be consulted as to all decisions affecting the
property. The parties were to split profits 50%/50% . See, Exhibit "B."
2

It is little wonder that the agreement is silent as to the sharing of losses. With the
$2.9 million contributed by 51-SPR for the land, and the $4.3 million on the construction
loan guarantied by 51-SPR, the venture was flush with enough cash to pay all anticipated
costs. There would literally be nothing but those construction loan funds themselves
which could reasonably be at stake to be lost in the transaction.
4

Gary D. Stott, and the liens were foreclosed. A copy of Judge Stott's Findings and
Conclusions is attached hereto as Exhibit "D." Shortly before trial, the subcontractor
judgments were paid by 51-SPR, leaving only EPCO's lien claim. The amount of the lien
claim was tried to the bench in a three-day trial, with EPCO putting on evidence of its
damages.3

The trial court enforced the lien and contract actions to the amount of

$721,215.93. It denied 51 -SPR' s abusive lien claim, denied that any portion of the liens had
been waived, and granted EPCO attorney fees. However, the trial court refused to permit
EPCO pre-judgment contractual interest4 on the grounds that the breach date was not clearly
defined due to EPCO's failure to send to Broadstone (by now, having ceased to operate as
a company) the final three construction draws, and the trial court refused to grant judgment
to EPCO on a $78,000 change order which had been duly signed by Broadstone. Finding and
Conclusions, Exhibit "D." 51-SPR appealed the trial court's finding that, as a matter of law,
51-SPR and Broadstone had formed a joint venture. 51 -SPR also appealed the trial court's
finding that the mechanics' liens were timely, that the lien waivers were ineffective, that the
$78,000 included in the lien claim was not an abusive lien, and that EPCO was entitled to
attorneys' fees. EPCO cross-appealed, requesting the appellate court to reverse the trial
3

The entitlement to a lien claim and the contract breach by 51-SPR (as a joint
venturer with Broadstone)had already been decided in EPCO's favor by way of crossmotions for summary judgment. However, the amount of the lien claim, the entitlement
to attorney fees and interest, and 51-SPR's abusive lien counterclaim, were reserved for
trial. With the contract claim already decided, most of the trial issues were academic,
except as it related to quantum of recovery.
4

The contract permitted interest at 10% on unpaid balances.
5

court's finding that EPCO was not entitled to interest on its contract claim and requesting the
$78,000 be awarded as a partnership debt.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's finding that a joint venture existed
between 51-SPR and Broadstone, and remanded for findings of fact on that subject. App.
Opinion f 18, Exhibit "A." It also reversed the trial court on the timeliness of the
mechanic's lien, the effectiveness of the lien waiver, and the awarding of interest to EPCO.
App. Opinionfflf19-47, Exhibit "A." The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
with respect to the denial of the abusive lien and the failure of the $78,000 to qualify as a
joint venture debt. Id. EPCO requested certiorari review issue of the joint venture liability
issue only, believing that if the contract claim could be resolved by this court, payment could
be made thereon, and the remaining issue of attorney fees and interest could be remanded to
the trial court for resolution at some future date. A writ of certiorari was issued by this Court
on December 14th, 2006. The Court also issued a writ of certiorari on a cross issue raised
by 51-SPR, to the effect that the abusive lien portion of the Mechanic's Lien Act appearing
at §38-1-25 is a strict liability statute.
If this Court holds for EPCO on this appeal, we ask that the amounts awarded be paid
from the bond on appeal. The remaining issues are much less complicated and can be
quickly resolved at the trial level if the contract claim is put to rest once and for all.
Facts Established in the Record Below:
On June 15, 2000, Guy Hatch, acting on behalf of his company Broadstone, entered

6

into an agreement with one Robert Chimento, acting through his company 51-SPR. The
parties referred to the agreement as Addendum No. 2. Development Agreement, Exhibit
"B"; App. Opinion | 2, Exhibit "A." The development agreement, identified a 6.58 acre
parcel in American Fork which the parties agreed they would jointly develop into two
commercial office buildings known as Northshore I and II. Development Agreement, Exhibit
"B." 51-SPR agreed to contribute cash and Broadstone agreed to contribute construction
expertise and services for the development of the office complex in a profit sharing venture.
Development Agreement, Exhibit "B."
Mr. Chimento personally negotiated the acquisition of the property. Summary
Judgment Order, p. 4, Exhibit "C." After acquiring the property, Broadstone entered into two
identical construction AIA form fixed-price construction agreements with EPCO for building
the structures of the buildings. Throughout the project and up until the project was nearly
completed, EPCO was unaware of 5l-SPR's participation in the development with
Broadstone and had all of its dealings exclusively with Hatch. Findings and Conclusions, p.
8,118 Exhibit "D"; App. Opinion 1j 3, Exhibit "A." Central Bank provided the short-term
construction funding and inspected EPCO' s work throughout the construction of the proj ects.
Findings and Conclusions, p. 3, Exhibit "D." During the course of construction, the
subcontractors submitted construction draws to EPCO, who in turn would submit draw
requests to Hatch. Id. Particularly toward the end of the project, Hatch became suspiciously
slow in submitting the EPCO draws to the bank. Tr. 302 to 303; App. Opinion, ^ 6, Exhibit

7

"A." This was because the bank loan had nearly run out,5 yet all of the contract balances had
not been paid to EPCO for work on the project. Tr. 317-321; App. Opinion T| 5, Exhibit "A."
After the draw requests were received by Central Bank, the bank issued joint checks to
EPCO and its subcontractors, which contained lien waivers on the backs of the checks. Lien
Waiver Ruling, p. 5, App. Opinion f 6, Exhibit "A." The trial court held that the lien waivers
on the backs of the checks applied, but only as of the draw date the subcontractors submitted
their respective draw requests, and not as of the day the check was issued, received, or
cashed. Lien Waiver Ruling, p. 5, App. Opinion ^f 6, Exhibit "A." The significance of this
is that, at the time of trial, the evidence showed that none of the contract balances were
waived by the lien releases appearing on checks issued by Central Bank on construction
payment requests made, in some instances, months earlier Tr. 309-311. The trial court
implicitly found that there was no portion of the lien claim that was waived by the interim
checks issued to the parties, because the waivers appliedpro tanto only to draw dates tied to
when the subcontractor submitted their pay requests.6 As the construction loan dwindled,7
5

51-SPR claimed that Hatch diverted part of the construction funding. However,
EPCO has never seen any evidence supporting this conclusion.
6

Regretfully, the >ourt did not make this an express provision of its Findings and
Conclusions, although it appears implicit in the court's holding since the lien amount
permitted was the exact equivalent of the contract balances owed. Findings and
Conclusions, p. 16, Exhibit "D." The court of appeals took umbrage with the absence of
an express finding on this point, and remanded the matter back to the trial court for
clarification. App. Opinion If 37, Exhibit "A."
7

Broadstone failed to pay three draws consisting of $217,145 on Building I and
$502,730 on Building II, before subcontractor amounts are backed out. Findings and
8

Broadstone failed to pay EPCO for several months. Tr. 293-98; App. Opinion f 5, Exhibit
"A." Despite the non-payment, EPCO raced through and completed the project. Toward the
end of the project Guy Hatch disappeared leaving change order requests un-processed and
nowhere for EPCO to send payment draw requests. Tr. 294; App. Opinion f 5, 7, Exhibit
"A." Because the invoices which had been sent to Broadstone were being ignored, and
because there was no one to process draws or change orders, EPCO did not send the last
three draws to Broadstone. TR. 294; App. Opinion f 5, Exhibit "A." The architect testified
at trial that all of the work within the scope of EPCO's contracts, and numerous change
orders, were satisfactorily completed. Findings and Conclusions, p. 16, Exhibit "D." 51 -SPR
did not suggest, nor was there any evidence at trial, that there was any work uncompleted by
EPCO or that any had been done in a defective manner. Findings and Conclusions, p. 7,
Exhibit "D." To the contrary, the testimony was that all work was satisfactorily completed.
Id.
After learning of 51-SPR, EPCO called Mr. Chimento asking for payment. Mr.
Chimento wrote to EPCO apologizing for the late payments and blaming it on the fact that
the long-term financing had not gone through. Summary Judgment Order, p. 12, Exhibit "C."
Soon thereafter, 51 -SPR kicked Guy Hatch off of the project. Id. at p. 8. Despite the fact that
it had exclusive control and ownership of two buildings built by EPCO, such that it was
receiving $70,000 per month in rents (while only debt servicing $20,00 per month to the

Conclusions, p. 7, f 12, Exhibit "D"; PL Ex. 27.
9

bank), 51 -SPR repudiated any obligation to pay EPCO or its subcontractors for construction
costs. Id. at p. 7. EPCO and most of its subcontractors filed liens.8 51-SPR sued EPCO and
the lien claimants and the actions were joined. As noted above, after extensive discovery,
the trial court granted summary judgment on the joint venture liability, holding that 51-SPR
was jointly and severally liable with Broadstone for all construction debts on the projects.
Summary Judgment Order, p. 12, Exhibit "C." Despite the court having concluded that it
was liable for all contract debts on the project, 51-SPR continued to contest the lien claims9
for another year-and-a-half, until Judge Stott granted final judgement on all lien and contract
claims. Findings and Conclusions, p. 7, Exhibit UD."
VIII. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF EPCO'S APPEAL10
A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY HOLDING THAT, EVEN WHERE
THE OTHER FOUR ELEMENTS OF A JOINT VENTURE ARE PRESENT,
THE LOSS-SHARING ELEMENT OF A JOINT VENTURE IS A FACT
QUESTION THAT CANNOT BE DECIDED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In the decision appealed from herein, the court of appeals stated in foot note 6:
8

EPCO's lien claim was in the amount of $850,651.07 and was inclusive of all the
claims of the subcontractors. Including the judgment obtained by EPCO, the settlement
and judgment amounts paid to all of the subcontractors, and attorney fees to date, 51-SPR
has incurred amounts well in excess of twice that figure.
9

51-SPR substituted the liens pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-28. The liens
were substituted by a corporate surety bond, which is also serving as a supercedes bond in
the appeal.
10

EPCO and 51-SPR stipulated that each party would provide one brief in which
they addressed the issues of their appeal and in opposition to the other parties' appeal.
The Supreme Court entered an Order approving the stipulation. Thus, Part VIII.
addresses EPCO's appeal and Part IX. addresses the cross-appeal of 51-SPR.
10

It appears, then, that in most instances where there is no express agreement between
the parties concerning the sharing of losses, the question of whether one has a duty
to share losses will ordinarily be a question of fact. Ellsworth Paulsen Construction
Company v. 51-SPR, LLC
EPCO challenges this conclusion. The court of appeals cites no case to support the
assertion, and we could find no Utah case that addresses the very narrow issue posed by this
maxim. As a general rule, such a conclusion may make sense to the extent the other four
elements11 of a joint venture are being litigated as questions of fact. But where there is an
express agreement - as here, in which the other four elements are clearly present - and the
agreement is silent as to the fifth loss-sharing element, EPCO believes that the better rule
is that the loss-sharing element must be inferred by operation of law from the presence of the
other four elements, and especially from the agreement to share in profits.
The most expressive case in Utah on the sharing of losses element is Mud Control
Laboratories v. Covey, 269 P.2d 845 (Utah 1954). In Mud Control, as in the case at bar, the
parties had an extensive 17-page agreement which defined their mining partnership
relationship.12

Under the agreement, one party contributed the drilling services and

physically drilled for oil, while the other partner capitalized the enterprise by contributing

11

These are: a community of interest in the performance of a common purpose, a
joint proprietary interest in the subject matter of the venture, a mutual right of control, a
right to share in the profits, and a duty to share losses which need not be express, but may
be inferred. Basset v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974).
12

51-SPR argued in its brief in opposition to certiorari that Mud Control can be
distinguished in that it applies to mining partnerships. That appears to be a distinction
without any meaning.
11

$ 16,000 for the drilling. A third-party vender sued both partners seeking payment for drilling
supplies. The financing partner (who fits the profile of 51 -SPR in the case at bar) argued that
it was not obligated to pay the bills of the other venturer, since the partnership agreement
expressly limited the financial partners losses to the $16,000 contributed. The Supreme
Court disagreed saying that as it related to third-party vendors:
It is not unusual for such relationships to come into being, either by operation
of law, or by express agreement, without the partners setting forth their
obligations as to losses that may accrue. Responsibility for such losses is
simply an incident of the partnership relation. It is elemental that when a
partnership is created, an agreement limiting liability is not binding on third
parties. Were it otherwise, partners could, by private agreement between
themselves, obtain the advantages of a limited partnership without complying
with the statutory requirements. Id. at 92-93. [Emphasis added].
In his opinion below, Judge Orme held that the owner of 51-SPR, Robert Chimento,
created a fact issue by providing an affidavit in which he stated that he did not intend by
entering into the agreement appearing in Exhibit "B" to share in any losses beyond his
investment. Ellsworth, supra at f 16. The problem with this holding is that it directly
conflicts with the Supreme Court's conclusion in Mud Control to the effect that where other
elements of a partnership are present, a financial partner and labor partner cannot legally
limit their liability to third-party venders by agreement amongst themselves. Thus, their
private intentions do not come into the analysis.
The other problem with the holding below in Ellsworth is that it permits the financial
partner to pick and choose what debts it pays by simply defining such debts as "losses." For
example, in the case at bar, in addition to the $2.9 million 51-SPR put into purchasing the
12

land, the company also guarantied a loan in the amount of $4.3 million dollars to pay for the
start-up operations of the Northshore properties. It made this financial guaranty months after
it entered into the partnership agreement appearing in Exhibit "B." Both before and after
it kicked Broadstone out of the project, it presumably paid all of the utility bills, taxes on the
property, maintenance fees, property management costs, title and property insurance, and all
of the other bills to run the enterprise so that it could continue to obtain the rental profits.
51-SPR also paid off all of the lien claimants except EPCO. Yet it takes the position it does
not have to pay EPCO's construction costs because they are "losses" and Mr. Chimento did
not intend to pay any more money than what he originally invested. No one has ever
suggested that the venture itself has actually lost money. To the contrary, Mr. Chimento
testified in his deposition that the properties made approximately $70,000 per month from
rents, while debt servicing $20,000 per month to the bank for loans. Summary Judgement
Order, p. 12, Exhibit "C." Since it has not paid for EPCO's construction costs, 51-SPR
"cherry picked" the Broadstone obligations it will pay, all the while enjoying all of the
benefits of ownership of two income producing assets by simply defining such costs as
"losses." While the holding in Mud Control was not a summary judgment, it serves to
buttress the conclusion that where the other elements of a partnership are present, the sharing
of losses element occurs "by operation of law."
The next case that bears resemblance to the facts of the case at bar is Cutler v. Bowen,
543 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1975). In Cutler, as in Mud Control, the parties jointly operated a
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tavern. One party contributed the physical assets of the tavern, and the other party provided
labor as she ran the establishment over a period of years. During the joint operations, the
parties met infrequently to split equally the net profits between themselves. When the
property was condemned by a redevelopment agency, the parties' bickered over whether the
redevelopment money should also be split equally. The Supreme Court noted:
When parties join in an enterprise, it is usually in contemplation of success and
making profits, and is often without much concern about who will bear losses.
However, when they so engage in a venture for their mutual benefit or profit,
that is generally held to be a partnership, in which the law imposes upon them
both liability for debts or losses that may occur. Id. at 1351. [Emphasis added.]
The Cutler and Mud Control cases bear resemblance to the case at bar in that as in the
present case, you have 51-SPR primarily contributing capitol, and Broadstone, with whom
EPCO had its contract, primarily contributing construction services and labor. The question
arises under such facts as to whether the financial partner should be bound by the agreements
of the partner providing the services. While not based on summary judgment, these cases
appear to follow the general rule throughout the country that as to the sharing of losses
element only (unlike to the other four elements), responsibility for losses are inferred as a
matter of law from the presence of the other elements. Parks v. Riverside Ins. Co. of
America, 308 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1962) ("An express agreement to share losses is not
essential. Under Oklahoma law, as well as under general law, such an agreement is implied
from an agreement to share profits."); Florida Tomato Packers v. Wilson, 296 So.2d 536
(Fla. App. 1974) ("A duty to share losses actually and impliedly exists as a matter of
14

law"...where one party supplies labor and the other party supplies capital.); Windes v.
RichmondHyparberic Medicine, Inc., 04-CV-854 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 20,2005) (Unpublished
opinion attached hereto as Exhibit "E" where the duty to share losses was inferred from an
express agreement to share profits.); Stilwellv. Trutanich, 178 Cal. App. 2d 614, 621; 3 Cal
Rptr. 285 (Cal. App. 1960) ("...[T]he law implies an obligation on the part of co-adventurers
to bear losses in the same proportion as they agree to divide the profits."); Viking Realty, Inc.
v. Balzebre, 535 So.2d 687 (Fla. App. 1988) (Summary judgment holding that where one
party contributes labor and services and the other contributes capital, the sharing of losses
element is automatically inferred.); Johnco, Inc. v. Jameson Interests, 741 So. 2d 867,871
(La. App. 1999) (Where one provides labor and the other provides capital, the element is met
by operation of law.).
The forgoing cases keep faith with the holdings of the Utah Supreme Court in Cutler
and Mud Control, finding that the sharing of losses element can be inferred as a matter of law
in instances where there is an agreement to share profits, the existence of the other elements
of a joint venture are present, and from the contribution of labor and services by one party
and capital by the other party.
In the Ellsworth decision below, the court of appeals blurred the distinction between
parties' internally allocating risks and liabilities between themselves in anticipation of a joint
venture, and what constitutes the sharing of losses in relation to the formation of a joint
venture. For example, the court of appeals stated in the opinion below that after Mr.
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Chimento put his initial capital at risk, the joint venture agreement contemplated Hatch and
Broadstone repaying future construction financing and providing other cash needs to the
project. Ellsworth at lj 16.

This term, it was argued, gave rise to a factual issue as to the

sharing of losses element. Id. However, internally allocating responsibilities among joint
venturers is not the legal equivalent of an agreement to share losses for amounts owed to
third parties. The court of appeals misconstrued what it means to share losses as it relates
to third-party debtors, versus an internal agreement to allocate liability between partners. A
careful reading of the cases demonstrates that the sharing of losses element is met when
parties place assets into a venture, and those assets are at risk, regardless of how the
participants treat matters internally.
As stated by an Ohio court:
We find no requirement that the members of a joint venture must pool
expenses as well as income; that is the characteristic of a partnership. In joint
ventures, pooling of expenses is not an absolute necessity. There is no reason
why the parties cannot agree as to which part of the expenses each should
bear before participating in profits... In addition, an agreement to share losses
need not be express. In the absence of such a provision, an agreement will be
implied to share losses to the same proportion as profits are shared. [Citations
omitted, emphasis added.] Kahle v. Turner, 420 N.E. 2d 127; 66 Ohio App. 2d
49, 52 (Ohio App. 1979).
In his summary judgment ruling at the trial court level, Judge Schofield based his
ruling on summary judgment more on the fact that Mr. Chimento had placed cash and real
property assets into the venture (and, therefore, put them at risk of loss), while Broadstone
and Mr. Hatch had placed their construction management services at risk of loss. As it
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relates to third-party creditors of the venture, these acts trump any internal agreement
requiring the parties to share expenses at any particular level. Sending this case back to the
trial court based upon a fact issue relating to which partner would to contribute to which
expenses misses the point entirely.
B.

THE MARDANLOU STANDARD FOR FINDING A JOINT VENTURE
SETS FORTH THE CORRECT STANDARD, AND THE ELLSWORTH
STANDARD FOR FINDING A JOINT VENTURE IS FLAWED.

There are two competing propositions in this appeal. The one put forth by EPCO and
supported by the court of appeals decision in Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian, 135 P.3d 904 (Utah
App. 2006)13 to the effect that the elements referred to in Basset v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah
1974) are general evidence of the formation of a joint venture, but do not require absolute
proof for each such element in order to establish a joint venture. The other proposition is the
one asserted by 51 -SPR and upheld by a different panel of the court of appeals in Ellsworth,
which requires strict proof as to each element in order to reach a finding of joint venture.
As will be seen below, EPCO feels that it was the Mardanlou court that got it right, and the
Ellsworth court went astray on requiring strict proof on each element.
Even a casual survey of Utah decisions regarding joint venture formation will reveal
that, in most instances, both at the trial level and on appeal, the courts reached a joint venture
findings without discussing each of the elements present in Basset. In other words, the

13

Mardanlou in footnote 3 went so far as to make the somewhat startling assertion
that even the sharing of profits element is not a requirement for a court to find a joint
venture, but merely that its presence is one evidence of the existence of a partnership.
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Basset elements were evidence that tended to support a finding of a joint venture, but not
prerequisites thereto. The cases demonstrate that if the overall facts tend to show that the
parties combined their property, money, skills, and assets to a common purpose, a court
could reach a joint venture finding without strict proof as to each separate element. For the
most part, these cases focus on the sharing of profits element and simply brush aside or
ignore any reference to the sharing of losses. Cf Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian, 135 P.3d 904
(Utah App. 2006); Nupetco Assoc, v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 889 (Utah 1983); Rogers v.
M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029,1033 (Utah 1987); Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213 (Utah App.
1999); Buehner Block Co. v. Glezo, 310 P.2d 517 (Utah 1957).
The better rule is that the Basset elements considered separately or in conjunction with
each other are matters to be considered when making the joint venture determination, but
none are independent conditions precedent to the creation of a partnership.
That strict proof is required as to each element of a joint venture is also belied by the
statutory definition of joint venture. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-4 states that the sharing of
profits is prima facie evidence of a joint venture. Prima facie evidence is that level of
evidence necessary to entitle the party bearing the burden of proof to a judgment if not
contravened by the other party. Bair v. Axiom Design, 20 P. 3d 388 (Utah 2001). It would
appear that this statute specifies that proof of the sharing of profits between two partners is
enough, without any other element, to establish the existence of the partnership sufficient to
render a judgment thereon. Nothing is said about the quantum of proof as to the other
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elements. Under this standard, summary judgment was appropriate because 51-SPR
acknowledged the profit-sharing requirement. At the very least, this statute would seem to
support the notion that the trial court was within its prerogative not to require strict proof as
to each element, especially when the other four elements are present. If strict proof of losssharing is not required, there is no reason to send the case back to the trial court. EPCO
submits that sending this case back to the trial court on such a trivial point would risk
another lengthy appeal that could extend the case for years. Applying a directed verdict
standard as set forth in Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50, and given the presence of the
other four elements of the joint venture, EPCO believes that a trial court could not reasonably
find that 51 -SPR was a mere investor who could own the buildings without having to pay for
them by reason its attempt to limit its losses in an internal agreement with a party that is
otherwise manifestly its partner.
The most commonsense statement of partnership law relative to the sharing of losses
and its relationship with other four elements, and whether or not loss sharing is a matter of
law, appears in Bromberg andRibstien on Partnership, Vol I, page 2:100:
The important question with regard to loss sharing is whether partnership
exists without an express agreement to share losses. This question is
significant because purported partners, expecting profits, often do not provide
for losses one way or the other. Some cases have denied partnership at least
partly because the parties did not expressly agree to share losses. More often,
the courts have held that loss sharing may be implied from other evidence of
partnership. The Texas Revised Partnership Act Page 2:102 codifies this result
by providing that "[a]n agreement to share losses by the owners of a business
is not necessary to create a partnership." The two positions may be reconciled
by recognizing that loss sharing takes on greater or lesser importance as an
19

x n d e p en dent element of partnership depending on the extent to which there is
other evidence supporting partnership. [Citations omitted, emphasis added.]
Since partners rarely contemplate losses \u incur dealings, much less in nen

condition precedent to the finding of a partnership is ji ist bad law. ii i& iuieh .. -my iu uc
present in the agreement, and when it is present, it should not be binding on _:md r\.:^
creditors of the venture, Such a rule would entitle the dominant partner, similar to 51-SPR

control the ventui e to the poi tit of dii ecting the effoi ts of the other partner and takii ig a
pledge of its assets, and yet still limit its liability for the debts of the partnership to third
parties, Sending the case back to the trial rouf- to make a factual determination ni whe^v?

who were not priv — i'viv:*

-P 1 :* i :• i^hvrv w • ,1 ,i- i . * -n^T-i n*1^

partners' intentions as to loss sharing. This is particularly so in the case at bar where one of
the partners has not been seen or heard from since being kicked from the partnership. EPCO

and where one of the parties cannot be located.
Better to make the rule as stated by Bi omberg and Ribstien that the sharing of losses
may be evidence of a joint \ eutiire, depending on the presence or absence, the strength or
weakness, of the other elem.en.ts.

C.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE
BASIS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN IT
HELD THAT INTERNAL LOSS-ALLOCATING (NOT LOSS-SHARING)
TERMS WITHIN THE AGREEMENT GAVE RISE TO A FACT
QUESTION.

The court of appeals' decision below on joint venture liability lacks cogency on
several levels. The decision elevates form over substance, technical procedure over a justice
and equity. The decision also lacks proportionality because it acknowledges the presence of
four of the elements of a joint venture, but then strains at nat in allowing for the possibility
that the joint venture was never formed by requiring EPCO to prove the parties' intentions
as to the agreement. In doing so, it ignores a host of well-settled evidentiary rules. For
example, Judge Schofield's decision granting summary judgment relied almost exclusively
on the written joint venture agreement between the parties. It is well settled that the
interpretation of an unambiguous agreement is a matter of law. ELM, Inc. v. M.T.
Enterprises, Inc., 968 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah App. 1998) (Where a contract is unambiguous,
its interpretation is a matter of law.) This court will search the record in vain for any
contention by any party that the joint venture agreement appearing herein as Exhibit "B" is
anything other than an fully-integrated unambiguous agreement. Under such an agreement,
Judge Schofield's duty was to read the agreement and apply the interpretative cannons. One
of those cannons is that parol evidence as to Mr. Chimento's private intentions regarding the
venture is not even admissible if the agreement is clear on its face, much less that it may form
the basis of reversible error and earn a remand to the trial court. Novell, Inc. v. The Canopy
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date of its purchase in December 1 x 2000. Id, at page n ITc further found thai r * -SPR had
lie t oi:il> tl le i igl it to control the enterpi ise, but that it actually exercised such e^Mi;.- -

1 lie U / L I I i wi a p p e a l s Iwlmu u. * i ^ l i u i

vn

v m i lie

<i-i plUXlUCU d p k l L s

interpretation of the agreement which supported his version o\ the loss-sharing requirement.
Since both interpretations weie plausible ^o the argument goes, fact issues preclude summary
Judgment. The problem \\ ith this conclusion is that it Hies in the teeth -f the holding in Mud
Control that said that partners could allocate expenses between each other, but could not limit
their liability to third-party vendors. In addition, regardless of how plausible a single line in an
agreement appears limiting ones liability with another partner it does not become ambiguous and
subject to parol evidence regarding intent if taken as a w hole it results in a different conclusion
Stated differently, when the agreement i« harmonized a- a \in»\ ^ith all of its sub-p.»ris. .! does
not have the look, taste, smell, and feel of 51 -SPR as a mere investor. Rather all of 5 i -SPR V
acts and statements lead to the inexorable conclusion that it was either a principal to Broadstone
acting as agent, or full-on eon-- nartnor ^iih Hm;idsinn.- - ith aH of th^ nohts -nvi .ii^.^attendant thereto.

point that it threw out Broadstone and seized complete control of Northshore and it profits.
Id. at ft, nt. 9, p. 8. Judge Schofield further noted that the joint venture agreement specified
the 50%/50% sharing of profits in at least three separate locations in the agreement, and that
such sharing of profits was prima facie evidence of a joint venture. Id. at p. 9. Finally, and
most critically, Judge Schofield held that when 51-SPR financed the purchase and
construction costs for $2.9 million and then later guaranteed $4.3 million in bank debt, and
further bore all of the risk attendant to property ownership, that these acts by themselves, and
without anything more, constituted the very definition of "loss sharing ." Id. at p. 10.
In making this ruling, Judge Schofield was not "inferring" the sharing of losses on
summary judgment as characterized by the court of appeals. Ellsworth, at f 12. Judge
Schofield made no such inference. There was also no weighing of evidence on the losssharing requirement. Rather, in viewing the facts in a light most favorable to 51-SPR, the
Judge noted that these acts—guarantying all bank debt, paying vendor invoices, holding
property in its own name, and pledging assets to the bank—meet the common law
requirements for 'loss sharing" as a matter of law, without regard to contrary testimony
from Mr. Chimento as to his intent to not share losses. EPCO is only requesting this Court
to reaffirm that the above acts are adequate to meet the loss-sharing requirements of Basset.
The court of appeals held that the agreement itself, when read together with the
Chimento Affidavit, create a fact issue as to whether 51-SPR's liability would be limited to
its investment. Ellsworth, at ^[16. However, it is not how the parties characterize their own
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Chimento d/d not intend to place at risk, the court of appeals' decision ignores the assets that
he actually did place at risk; namely, the $2.9 million, the $4.3 million, and the property

regardless of what Mr. Chimento secretly intended to protect as separate proper ty
The coin t of appeals' argunu vi also misconstrued the loss-sharing requirement when
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i ne aii5v\ ei to me ,^:ii*c on uiib appeal is IOI un:-. i ouri 10 define what i:> IHCJ
by ihe shannu o\ losses " The court of appeals erroneously found that the losses at ^ - . K
in a joint venture analysis aie die obligations to third panics if the venture goes south.
However, a careful reading o\ Basse! and of Judge Schofield's order below make it clear
that the losses element refers to assets brought into the partnership, w liieh ma\ be lu^i
because the venture is noi profitable, and not the ahocat:on of [Partnership vender debts
that is important. It is this loi mei definition w Inch courts across the Country have relied
upon in stating that the sharing of losses is inferred when one partner contributes capital
and the other partner contributes labor or services. See, infra at page 3. A definition
implicit in Judge Orme's holding below that focuses on the parties' internal risksallocating terms is misplaced and has no bearing on a ^imiman. unUmient ai»..l\ MS
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EPCO did not know that 51-SPR was the linaiu lal hackei Ibi the project 1^: it
knew that the land was to be used for construction, and ihat (here w as several nullum
dollars available in the bank to fund the construction. As to the loss-sharing element, it
was the undisputed fact o( > 1 -SPR placing these assets at risk, together with the
admission of the presence ol the other elements, which prompted the summaiy judgment
ruling that the latter companx was jointly and severally liable with Broadstone v thirl
party creditors. Summary Judgment Order, Fxhibit "C."

"A partial limitation on 51-SPR's liability for losses would not preclude a
finding of a joint venture under the Basset factors. In making the joint venture
determination, the duty to share losses is a factor unless there is an agreement
to the contrary. Basset v. Baker. P. 2d.[sic]." Summary Judgment Order,
Exhibit "C," ft. nt. 15, p. 11. [Emphasis are Judge Schofield's.]
In other words, Judge Schofield was cognizant of the loss-allocating terms of the
agreement (as contrasted to the loss-sharing requirement) between the parties, which the
court of appeals held created a fact issue on the sharing of losses, but implied that such
internal provisions were not determinative as to third-party creditors where the parties
themselves defined how the losses would be allocated.
Furthermore, the joint venture agreement expressly states that Broadstone's
"...ownership and control shall be pledged to Chimento to secure the LLC's and Hatch's
obligation." Exhibit "B," p 2. It is hardly a meaningful gesture for the parties to allocate
"loss-sharing" responsibility for third-party debts prior to entering the joint venture, when
one parties' entire ownership as a whole is pledged to the other party for that purpose.
In short, disputed facts do not preclude summary judgment where the facts are
immaterial in light of the other decisive factors. Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649,655 (Utah App.
1995). Burn v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah App. 1994) ("According
to the Utah Supreme Court, 'the mere existence of a genuine issue of fact...does not preclude
the entry of summary judgment if those facts are immaterial to the resolution of the case.'").
For the court of appeals to declare that because the agreement is silent on the "sharing of
losses" 51-SPRmay be absolved bearing EPCO's costs, is itself a circular argument, which
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any unjustified advantage or benefit. (2) In addition to any criminal penalties under
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or an original conuaeioi < -i subcontractor who is affected by the lien for the greater of: fa)
t\\ ice the amount bv w Inch \\\ ^ iun;jiui lien exceeds the amount actually due; ui (b) the
actual damages incurred h\ ik ownu of the property.

above.
A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE ABUSIVE
LIEN STATUTE IS NOT A STRICT LIABILITY STATUTE
1. The Abusive Lien Statute Is Not A Strict Liability Statute.

The issue before the court of appeals was whether or not the trial court properly found
that EPCO did not file an abusive lien, because it did not have the requisite malicious intent
to implicate the Abusive Lien Statute. In making this argument, 51-SPR does not attempt
to marshal any evidence regarding the evidentiary basis for trial court's findings that the lien
was not abusive and that there was no malicious or willful intent associated with filing the
lien. Rather, 51-SPR argues that the Abusive Lien Statute does not require specific intent,
but only requires the general intent to file a lien.18
51-SPR is attempting to argue that the Abusive Lien Act is a strict liability statute
which permits a litigant to claim the civil and criminal remedies referred to in that Act every
time a person does not collect every cent of his or her lien. 51 -SPR buttresses this argument
with dubious cannons of statutory interpretation and fuzzy grammar. Specifically, 51-SPR
argues that because the introductory preamble to the statute defines the lien as "abusive" if

18

51-SPR's dissimulation should not be lost on the Court. In one half of their
argument on joint venture liability they contend that they are an innocent investor who
never intended to participate more than to get an honest return on their investment. In the
second part related to the abusive lien, they assert that EPCO never had the right to give
$78,000 to the project toward engineering fees then ask for it back as a part of its contract
and lien claim, and that as the true owner of the improvements, 51-SPR is an innocent
victim of an abusive lien.
27
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i IK C-.ISL- at bar ih mstiuaive as to v\ hat u> urong uith 51-SPR's argument,
EPCCTs judgment was for S\!L215. ( H on a mechanic's lien el tin. ot S850.65I >7.
Hou e\er. at the lime the hen ^ as tiled, none of HIVO's subcontractors had been paid, -o
they filed aggiv^aic liens for an additional approximately $400,000.00 Since 5 " -SPR
paid the subcontractor liens off on the door step of trial, with the benefit of hindsight,
HPLU's lien was actually understated b\ sex era! hundred thousand dollars at the time it
was filed, Thus, 51-SPR cannot even meet the threshold requirements of the Ahusiw
Lien Statute of HPCO filing an overstated lien or that it was trying to obtain an unjustified
advantage. Ye- unlet .51 -SPR s \ isum ui the statute, ^incc the lien uu:> more ih^n the
judgment, it is by definition abusive

purposes, because all would be a "crap shoot" as whether you would prevail. The lienor
could be strictly liable under the statute because without the intent requirement, a failed lien
would by definition be extracting more than is due and result in an unjustified advantage.
Such an absurd result would "chill" the filing of liens back into the ice age.
The proper reading of the Abusive Lien Statute is that the words "...intentionally
causes a claim of lien to be filed against any property which contains a greater demand than
the sum due to be recorded or filed," modifies all three of the subordinate passages, such that
all three bad acts: 1) intending20 to cloud title; 2) exacting from the owner more than is due;
and 3) procuring an unjustified advantage, requires a showing of intent However, it is clear
from the statute that all three types of actions, clouding title,21 exacting excessive money, and
procuring an unjustified advantage, are intent-, mens rea-type acts. The very nature of an
allegation that a lien is "abusive" is fraught with the connotation of a culpable mental state
requiring a wilful, flagrant, or reckless indifference to the property rights of another.

20

When seen in context, the word "intentionally" in the introductory sentence
making it a crime to file and excessive lien should be read to mean "maliciously," and the
word "intent" in the sub-part should be read to mean "purposefully."
21

It should be obvious that filing a mechanic's lien clouds the title of the property
owner, and further that every act of clouding someone's title is not abusive, nor does it
represent a criminal offense. By adding the words "with the intent" in front of the words
"to cloud title," the legislature merely attempted to accentuate the notion that filing of the
lien—even if accidently overstated—was not proscribed, but filing it solely with the
objective of clouding the owner's title was abusive. In making this distinction, the
legislature did not clearly manifest a legislative purpose to make the filing of a lien for an
amount greater than what is ultimately found to be owed a strict liability act.
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Strict Liability,
51-SPR takes umbrage with the court of appeals' conclusion that even though subparts ()Mb) ai ; HVcl of tin Mnisi'v I ion Statute are redundant and do not specify the
requsik. nieni ^ ...;uit. u ^ ;<, . , ;-. • • aiinal statute ..^ .. i*;*..1. .a;pa*ae mental state

102 (2003) is a default provision which states that every prohibited act requires a culpable
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Miuwingly, or recklessly.
'(|ffi>t'i7 us pi'^oj firn «"M\

///c*/v e.x/.s7.y a c/ear legislative purpose in making the statute a sti ict liability statute. Id.
Against all odds, 51-SPR argues in its cross-petit inn for wril of certiorari (hat a-ang
the word "" intentionally ' and " intent ' in (1) and subsection (l)(a) respectively, but not in

latter-two actions. However, such an interpretation is contrary to a long line of cases which
hold that:
The purpose of ir-: m^cnanics lien aci is remedial in nature and seek;, to
provide protection to laborers and materialmen who have added directly to the
value of the property of another by their materials or labor. First ofD*** <-'•
Mortgage Investors v. Zundel and Assoc, OUU P.2J 521 (Utah 1979).

2

Under the court ul appeals"' interpretation, the ueiauit c u r a b l e mentas . I K •
"intent, knowledge, or recklessness. Ellsworth at ^f 3 1 ; Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102

The clear legislative purpose of treating the Abusive Lien Statue as a mens rea statute
as opposed to a strict liability statute is seen with Section 38-1-1823 which permits offers of
judgment on lien amounts. If the judgment against the land owner is less than the amount
offered by the landowner, the lien claimant is required to pay the attorney fees of the land
owner. This statute also states that if the lien is found to be abusive under the Abusive Lien
Statute § 3 8-1 -25, the lienor may not recover his attorney fees at all. This statute effectively
shifts the burden of attorney fees to the lien filer if he overstates his lien, and causes him to
forfeit his attorney fees if his lien is found to be abusive. These statutes manifest a legislative
purpose in not making the Abusive Lien Statute a strict liability statute, since the offer of
judgment statute (which was enacted at the same time as the Abusive Lien Statute) is
designed to address the situation where a party innocently overstates his lien, but does not
do so maliciously. In such a case, the result is he loses his attorney fees. In contrast, the
Abusive Lien Statute permits severe criminal and civil penalties, but requires scienter and
animus in order to invoke those penalties. The clear legislative purpose in not making an
overstated lien a crime is also manifest by the Wrongful Lien Statute appearing at Utah Code
Ann. £ 38-9-2(3). That statute states that the wrongful lien provisions do not apply to "a
person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38 Chapter

23

In discerning the legislative purpose of a statute, the Court should look to
harmonize it with other sections of the same statute. State v. Martinez, 52 P.3d 1276 1279
(Utah 2002) (Finding a legislative intent in making a statute a strict liability statute, where
such intent was expressed in related statutes.).
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*' The court ot appeals at footnote 12 analogized this claim by FPCO for a return
of the $78,000 to a partner buying skis for himself from the owner and then issuing a
change order lo the owner for the value of the skis Flu -our! then concludes that ihowner does not have a contract or lien right againsi the owner for the \ alue of the skis.
despite the contract modification for their value. If the partner has actual, apparent and
implied authority i which the court of appeals' "paiable" assumes). FPCO takes grave
umbrage both w ith the conclusion reached on this issue, and the analog}' used, since r the
ease at bar, the mone> was allegedly to be used to pay for engineering costs on the
project. However, that is not the subject of this appeal.

money for that project, EPCO's $800,000 lien was abusive when it contained a $78,000
component for that amount. In essence, 51-SPR is saying that even when armed with a
contract modification, EPCO could not claim a lien for an amount that did not actually go
into the ground at the project. Frankly, EPCO is having trouble understanding how one
claims "more than is due" when he has a contract specifying that exact amount. The statute
would seem to lead to the opposite conclusion, since by definition, if you have a contractual
basis for your claim, you are not claiming for more than is due under the contract. If the day
comes that a lien claimant cannot make his lien claim co-terminus with his contract claim,
100 years of lien law will be stood on its head.
What 51-SPR is saying is that the lien must be abusive if it does not result in an
integrated improvement to the property. However, this tired and threadbare argument has
been answered on many occasions by this Court. For example, in John Wagner & Assoc, v.
Hurcules, Lnc, 797 P.2d 1123, 1132 (Utah App. 1990), the court permitted recovery for
modular buildings which were not anchored to the property. In Trench Shoring v. Saratoga
Springs Development, LLC 57 P3d 241,246, (Utah App. 2006) the court permitted recovery

25

Richard Ellsworth testified that he did not know if Hatch used money for design
work in the Northshore plaza, or indeed, if it was even paid to Hubble for design work at
all. Tr. 65-66. The trial court stated that "Ellsworth Paulsen acted in good faith and upon
the instructions of the owner of the property when placing its lien." Findings and
Conclusions, If 16, p. 8., Exhibit "D." The simple facts are that no one knows where the
money went that was given to Hatch, but that EPCO was armed with a change order on
the Northshore project—from the only person with whom EPCO dealt on the
project—when it filed the lien which included the change order amount.
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replaced. The courts in these cases have indicated that it is not whether the "^npen, 15
actually impro\ ed, but whether there was \ alue conferred by the contractor,
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evidence for review, but simply selectively classifies the evidence that exists to suppor t its
thesis.
51 SI rR seems to contend that e^ en if a per son has a contract for construct KM- he

to believe that a trial court is required, when confronted vvnh u iicn claim, to pai^e tin*- ••:.1'
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contract as non-lienable. However, in making this argument, 51-SPR seems to forget that
the best evidence of the "value of the services rendered, labor performed or materials or
equipment furnished..." [§ 38-1-3] is the contract itself.

See, Trench Shore Services v.

Saratoga Springs Development, LLC 57 P3d 241,246 (Ut. App. 2006) (Case seems to hold
for the proposition that the best evidence to support its reasonable lienable value is that
amount appearing in the contract.). 51 -SPR argues in its brief in support of its cross-petition
for writ of certiorari that liens cannot be claimed for contractual items or debts the contractor
incurs but which are not incorporated into the property. Construction contractors advance
money for permits, transportation of materials, surety bonds, design work, environmental
studies, overhead, extended warranties, profit, testing, inspections, barricades, flag men and
women, and scores of other items that may not actually result in an improvement to real
property. Yet 51-SPR would have this Court go down a slippery slope and hold that even
with a construction contract which designates such items for reimbursement from the owner,
a lien claimant can only lien for those items that actually improve the real property. This is
contrary to the remedial purposes of the lien statute, and the broad legislative purpose to
protect suppliers and subcontractors. John Wagner & Assoc, v. Hurcules, Inc., 797 P.2d
1123, 1132 (Utah App. 1990).
However, even if one were to find that an individual component of a lien is not
recoverable from under the lien statute, that is light-years away from saying that the lien was,
therefore, abusive. The clear meaning and intent of the Abusive Lien Statute requires a
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civil penalties of that Act. ' Hie trial court, which had the ability to observe 'the demeanor of
witnesses in a highly factual "intent" setting, found that the lien was made in good fa ill ^ >
reverse would require a finding of clear error, I he facts in this case simply do not lend
themselves to i.n« li .i • om ly.it>ii
7\s

the trial court and court of appeals found, when a contractor is armed w ith a

change order from the owner modifying the contract. \u- uch owner

and particularly no

subsequent owner—has grounds u» dami that the iicn --•• iu.. ^_.fining contract amount

demand than the sum due." Unless the court retreats from an intent requirement and applies
a strict liability standard, as long as there is a contractual basis for the lien, the lien is not
abusive unuu -;u dilute.

x.
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Because the sharing of losses element is a mauc. of law, and the sharing of losses
element refers to the assets each partner places at risk in the venture and not the debts to third
pai ties, the court of appeals decisioi 1 to send the case back to the trial court h <» u., w.u
de* nninah. -

•

• •

I ! inall) be :ai lse strict proof of this elei i i = lit is i i : t

required but oni^ represents evidence as to the existence of a joint venture, there is no just
reason that this coiirt cannot affirm the trial court's summary judgment on the contract claim,
i" •

'• •• n:-;h .

:. .uagincm against 51 SI J|IR foi $' / 21,215.93 plus interest at the parties'

contractual rate of 10% from the date the judgment was entered.26 On 51-SPR's crossappeal, the legislative purpose behind the Abusive Lien Statute appearing at Utah Code Ann.
§38-1-25 makes it clear that it is not a strict liability statute, and a contractual basis for filing
a lien is adequate to meet the good faith requirements of the Abusive Lien Statute.

lis <f s
DATED this

day of January, 2007.

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

Maflrf^Poulsen
^%ret W.Reich
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
(801) 576-1400
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Petitioner, Cross-Respondent,
Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company

26

The court of appeals referred the case back to the trial court for a determination
as to whether pre-judgment interest from the date of the default to the date of trial was
allowed, based upon a fact question as to when the construction draws were submitted
and whether there was an owner present to whom the draws could be submitted.
However, the trial court's determination that post-judgment interest at the contractual
interest rate of 10% would be part of the judgment has never been appealed from and
should be part of the contract claim awarded if this Court reverses the holding of the court
of appeals.
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OPINION BY: ORME
OPINION: ORME, Judge:
[*P1] This case arises from a real estate
project gone bad. We have before us the appeal
and cross-appeal from several aspects of the
trial court's rulings. We reverse in part and affirm in part, and remand for additional proceedings.

BACKGROUND
[*P2] Plaintiff Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company (Ellsworth) entered into two
construction contracts with Guy Hatch and his
company, Broadstone Investments, L.C.
(Broadstone), under which Ellsworth agreed to
act as general contractor for the construction of
two commercial buildings (Building I and
Building II) as part of a project in American
Fork, Utah (the Northshore Property). 51-SPR,
L.L.C. (SPR), through its owner, Robert Chimento, entered into an agreement with Hatch
and Broadstone (the Agreement), which provided, among [**2] other things, that SPR
would contribute $ 2.9 million toward the purchase and development of the Northshore
Property and take title to the property as a tenant in common with Broadstone. Based on the
Agreement and SPR's actions, the trial court
ruled on a partial summary judgment motion
that SPR and Broadstone were joint venturers
in the development of the Northshore Property
and, thus, that SPR shared liability on the construction contracts Broadstone had entered into
with Ellsworth.
[*P3]
Apparently, however, Ellsworth
knew nothing about SPR's involvement in the
project, having no direct dealings with SPR un-

til Hatch disappeared toward the end of construction and Ellsworth sought payment on outstanding invoices that Hatch had left unpaid, nl
Until that time, Ellsworth had dealt exclusively
with Hatch as the owner of Broadstone, Broadstone being designated under the Agreement as
the project manager in charge of supervising
construction on the Northshore Property.

nl According to SPR, Hatch left Utah
for Hawaii, where he apparently remains
to this day.
[**3]
[*P4] To fund the construction, Broadstone had entered into two separate construction loan arrangements with Central Bank,
which Hatch and a co-member of Broadstone,
Dan Parkinson, personally guarantied. Under
the Agreement, Broadstone was "in charge of
obtaining remaining needed construction financing and institutional permanent financing."
The Agreement also required that Broadstone
was to "provide financing for needed construction monies for the office building[s] and remaining cash needs of the project" beyond
SPR's $ 2.9 million investment. The Agreement
also expressly provided that "Guy Hatch will
guaranty such financing."
[*P5] Prior to disappearing, and toward
the end of construction on the Northshore
Property, Hatch had become suspiciously slow
in paying Ellsworth's invoices, apparently due
to the fact that the construction loan funds w^e
almost exhausted. At least according to SPR,
Hatch had been drawing on the construction
loan funds and using them in other projects unrelated to the Northshore Property. Despite not
being paid, Ellsworth continued its work. Toward the end of the project, with the construction loan funds apparently exhausted and Hatch
having [**4] disappeared, Ellsworth had nowhere to send its final three draw requests.

[*P6] Throughout the earlier course of
construction, Ellsworth would submit draw requests to Central Bank either directly or
through Hatch. Once the draws were approved,
Central Bank would then issue checks to Ellsworth for its work and for the work of its subcontractors. Each check bore a lien waiver provision on the reverse side of the instrument. n2
The trial court ruled on summary judgment that
the lien waivers were valid and enforceable,
and therefore cut off any lien rights through the
date of each draw request, which is the date the
draw was requested and not the date the check
was received or cashed. In considering a subsequent motion for summary judgment, however,
the trial court ruled that the indemnity provision within the lien waivers was inapplicable,
invalid, and unenforceable, and that Ellsworth
was not responsible to indemnify SPR against
any subcontractor claims.

n2 The lien waiver provisions read, in
pertinent part:

In consideration of payment
of this check, payee by negotiating this check waives,
releases, and relinquishes all
right of lien or claims payee
may have up to the date of
the draw request described
on the reverse side hereof
(the "Draw Date"), upon the
property described on the
reverse side hereof (the
"Property"). The payee certifies that this check is payment for labor and materials
that were actually performed
upon and furnished to the
Property. Payee warrants
and guarantees under penalty
of fraud that payment in full
has been made by payee to

the suppliers of all labor and
materials to the Property incurred up to the Draw Date
at the insistence of payee.
Payee agrees to indemnify
and hold harmless the owner
of the Property and Central
Bank or its assigns, from any
loss, claims, or expenses incurred by them by reason of
or rising out of any liens or
claims made against the
Property by any supplier of
labor [or] material at the insistence of payee.

[**5]
[*P7] After Hatch disappeared and the
loan funds were exhausted, Ellsworth learned
of SPR's involvement in the project and approached SPR directly for payment for the
completed work. SPR, viewing itself as a mere
investor or limited partner, disclaimed any obligation to pay Ellsworth or its subcontractors.
n3 Ellsworth then filed a mechanic's lien
against Building I and Building II, and commenced this action to foreclose the lien. n4 After initially ruling on a motion for summary
judgment that there was a question of fact concerning whether Ellsworth's lien had been
timely filed, the trial court reconsidered its ruling and concluded that the mechanic's lien was
timely filed and otherwise valid. Also on summary judgment, the trial court dismissed Ellsworth's claim that SPR failed to obtain a paymen* bond.

n3 Shortly before Hatch disappeared,
SPR learned of Hatch's purported misuse
of the Northshore Property construction
funds, SPR confronted Hatch, and Hatch
agreed to relinquish to SPR Broadstone's
one-half interest in the property. By the
time SPR assumed control of the North-

shore Property, Broadstone had defaulted
on the two construction loans.
[**6]

n4 Several of Ellsworth's subcontractors also filed mechanics' liens and the
trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the subcontractors who had filed
liens. To avoid foreclosure of those liens,
SPR apparently paid those claims, leaving only Ellsworth's lien and contract
claims remaining to be resolved. Thus,
this appeal involves only Ellsworth's
claims against SPR.
[*P8] Ellsworth brought additional claims
against Hatch and Broadstone for, among other
things, failure to pay amounts due under two
construction contracts entered into pursuant to
the Agreement. Ellsworth brought those same
claims against SPR on the theory that SPR was
in a joint venture relationship with Hatch and
Broadstone in the development of the Northshore Property. SPR defended against these
claims by initiating, in a separate proceeding
which was later consolidated into this lawsuit,
an action to quiet title in Building I and Building II. SPR also brought claims against Ellsworth under Utah's abusive lien statute, see
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25 (2005), for including in its lien claim [**7] $ 78,000 that SPR
asserted was attributable to an unrelated project
on which Hatch and Ellsworth were collaborating without SPR's involvement.
[*P9] A three-day bench trial was held on
the issues not previously decided on summary
judgment. At the conclusion of the trial, the
court ruled in Ellsworth's favor on its lien and
breach of contract claims in the amount of just
over $ 721,000. Although it disallowed the
claim for $ 78,000, the trial court denied SPR's
related abusive lien argument, holding that
Ellsworth had acted in good faith in including
the $ 78,000 in its lien claim and had not in-

tended to exact more from SPR than was due.
The trial court also granted Ellsworth attorney
fees as the prevailing party under the lien statute, but refused to award Ellsworth prejudgment contractual interest on its final three
draws because Ellsworth never submitted those
final draws and, thus, the court could not fix a
date at which the contract was breached and
from which interest began to accrue. Both sides
now appeal various aspects of the trial court's
resolution of this complicated dispute.

courts are faced with a more difficult determination.

n5 The Utah Supreme Court has
stated the "essential" elements of the
joint venture relationship as follows:

The parties must combine
their property, money, effects, skill, labor and knowledge. As a general rule, there
must be a community of interest in the performance of
the common purpose, a joint
proprietary interest in the
subject matter, a mutual
right to control, a right to
share in the profits, and
unless there is an agreement
to the contrary, a duty to
share in any losses which
may be sustained.

ANALYSIS
I. Joint Venture Ruling
[*P10] SPR argues that the trial court
erred in [**8] concluding, on partial summary
judgment, that it was in a joint venture relationship with Broadstone and Hatch. Specifically,
SPR attacks the trial court's conclusion that
SPR had a duty to share in the losses of the
Northshore Property. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the key issue of whether SPR agreed to share losses with
Broadstone and Hatch, we reverse the trial
court's partial summary judgment ruling.
[*P11] The "duty to share in any losses" is
one of the elements of a joint venture relationship that the Utah Supreme Court has deemed
to be "essential" to the existence of such a relationship. Bassett v. Baker, 530 P. 2d 1, 2 (Utah
1974), n5 See also Betens on v. Call Auto &
Equip. Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah
1982). It goes without saying that a duty to
share losses is present in a relationship where a
"written agreement specifically provide[s] for
the sharing of losses." Harline v. Campbell,
728 P.2d 980, 983 (Utah 1986). Likewise,
where the sharing of losses is "specifically excluded by [an] agreement," no duty to share
losses can be found to support a conclusion that
parties are in [**9] a joint venture relationship.
Betenson, 645 P. 2d at 686. Where, however, an
agreement fails to specifically provide for or
exclude a duty to share losses-which we conclude is true of the Agreement in this case-

Bassett v. Baker, 530 P. 2d 1, 2 (Utah
1974). The trial court concluded on
summary judgment that all the other essential elements were also present in the
relationship between SPR and Broadstone, a conclusion SPR does not dispute
on appeal.
[**10]
[*P12] Ellsworth argues that in such instances a duty to share losses may be inferred
from an agreement or from the nature of the
parties' relationship, especially when all the
other elements of a joint venture relationship
are present. While the Utah Supreme Court has
indicated that "the agreement to share losses
need not necessarily be stated in specific terms
. . . to permit [a] court to infer that the parties
intend[ed] to share losses as well as profits,"
Bassett, 530 P. 2d at 2, Utah case law does not

appear to support the notion advanced by Ellsworth that Utah courts have routinely made
such an inference on summary judgment. Instead, "any doubt concerning questions of fact,
including evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in
favor of the [party opposing summary judgment]." Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick
Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah Ct. App 1989).
Inferring on summary judgment a duty to share
losses runs counter to this precept. n6

n6 It appears, then, that in most instances where there is no express agreement between parties concerning the
sharing of losses, the question of whether
one has a duty to share in losses will ordinarily be a question of fact—just as the
overarching question of "[w]hether a
joint venture exists is ordinarily a question of fact," Strand v. Cranney, 607
P.2d 295, 296 (Utah 79S0J--because the
joint venture relationship itself "does not
always arise pursuant to formal agreement." Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738
P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1987). Of course,
where the facts are truly not in dispute,
the duty to share losses, or the existence
of a joint venture for that matter, may be
determined as a matter of law. See Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974).
[**11]
[*P13] The trial court concluded that
"[t]he terms of the Agreement, SPR's ownership interest in the Project, and SPR's undisputed actions all gave rise to SPR's duty to
share in any losses which may be sustained by
the Project." Ellsworth argues that the trial
court properly inferred from the Agreement,
SPR's undisputed actions, and the other undisputed facts that SPR had the duty to share in
losses. We disagree because when "we view the
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to [SPR],"

there is a genuine dispute of fact on a material
issue, which precludes summary judgment.
Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc.,
2000 UT 71, P15, 10 P3d 338. See also Beehive. 780P2dat832.
[*P14] "A genuine issue of fact exists
where, on the basis of the facts in the record,
reasonable minds could differ' on any material
issue." Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882
P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted).
Here, on the material issue of whether SPR had
a duty to share losses, a genuine issue of fact
arises out of reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from a combination of [**12] the
Agreement itself; the affidavit testimony of
Robert Chimento, the owner of SPR; and other
undisputed facts before the court.
[*P15] Although the trial court regarded
Chimento's affidavit testimony as nothing more
than "bald assertions" and "conclusory allegations" that did not "create any genuine issue of
material fact" because they were "sharply contradicted by both the terms of the Agreement
and the undisputed facts," we conclude that
Chimento's affidavit did create an issue of fact
concerning the duty to share losses. Indeed,
when Chimento's affidavit testimony is viewed
together with the Agreement's provisions, several of the provisions, rather than "sharply contradicting]" his testimony, actually lend credence to his assertions and give rise to reasonable inferences favorable to SPR's position.
[*P16] Chimento's affidavit asserts that
under the Agreement the narties intended to
make Hatch and Broadstone solely responsible
for "all expenses, costs, losses, and risks associated with the Northshore project and did not
intend to make SPR liable for any losses, liabilities, or responsibilities, meaning that SPR
stood only to lose its capital investment in the
[**13] Northshore Property. The provisions in
the Agreement that expressly release SPR from
all obligations arising by way of any note or
guaranty for construction financing and instead
place the sole obligation of obtaining and re-

paying construction financing and other cash
needs of the project on Broadstone and Hatch,
at the very least give rise to the inference that
SPR did not agree to share in other financial
obligations, i.e., the net operating losses of the
Northshore Property. Additionally, the Agreement's terms guarantying SPR "a 10% return on
its capital commencing December 1, 2000,"
with Broadstone and Hatch guarantying to even
"contribute any and all sums to the project
needed for payment of such return," support
Chimento's affidavit and the inference that even
if the project lost money, Broadstone alone
bore the responsibility to contribute funds to
cover the losses and to ensure that SPR, as an
investor, received its guarantied return.

stood only to lose its investment and
nothing more if the project failed. Moreover, much like in the realm of partnerships, holding property as tenants in
common does not by itself establish a
joint venture relationship. Cf. Utah Code
Ann. § 48-1-4(2) (2002) ("Joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, tenancy by entireties, joint property, common property, or
part ownership does not of itself establish
a partnership, whether such co-owners do
or do not share any profits made by the
use of the property.").
[**15]

[*P17] Other terms of the Agreement that
the trial court interpreted as having "essentially
put SPR's $ 2.9 million immediately at risk
should the venture completely fail" and making
"SPR one-half owner of a tenancy in common
with all the [**14] accompanying liabilities of
a real property owner," when viewed in their
proper light on summary judgment, together
with Chimento's affidavit, also give rise to
equally plausible inferences that contradict the
trial court's conclusion that SPR agreed to share
in the losses of the project. n7 In addition,
SPR's "undisputed actions" on which the trial
court relied to conclude SPR was not acting as
a mere investor-i.e., "when it agreed with Central Bank in April, 2002 to guarantee 'Broadstone's' [$ ]4.3 million construction loans" and
when it "voluntarily conveyed the Project property to Broadstone for one day in January 2001
so that Broadstone could secure additional financing for the Project" n8 -when viewed in
the light most favorable to SPR, also support
the assertion that SPR may not have agreed to
share in losses.

n8 The trial court inferred from these
actions that "[SPR] voluntarily put its
own property at greater risk of loss" than
would an "investor" or "simple creditor,"
and that SPR had thereby waived the protection of language in the Agreement
limiting SPR's obligation arising by reason of any note or guaranty for construction financing. The court concluded that
these actions manifested SPR's duty to
share in losses. But it is equally plausible
to infer from such actions that SPR was
merely acting to protect its investment—
and the potential return on its investment—by seeking to avoid foreclosure of
the construction loans. Moreover, by
mortgaging its interest in the Northshore
Property, SPR did put the property at
r
isk, but arguably only stood to lose its
capital investment—which was used to
purchase the property in the first place—
and notLing more.

n7 For example, the fact that SPR's
capital investment was put at risk by the
Agreement quite reasonably supports the
inference that SPR, like any investor,

[*P18] While we do not suggest that the
inferences the trial court drew from the Agreement and other evidence before it are necessarily incorrect, the fact that there are other
equally plausible inferences to be drawn from
the evidence manifests [**16] that summary

judgment should not have been granted. See
Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, P18, 44
P.3d 704 (Wilkins, J., concurring in the result)
("Where, as here, equally plausible contrary
inferences may be drawn, neither party should
have been granted summary judgment."). Indeed,

[a] party opposing the motion is
required only to show that there is
a material issue of fact. Affidavits
and depositions submitted in support of and in opposition to a motion for summary judgment may be
used only to determine whether a
material issue of fact exists, not to
determine whether one party's case
is less persuasive than another's or
is not likely to succeed in a trial on
the merits.

Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d
926, 928 (Utah 1993). We therefore reverse the
trial court's judgment on this issue and remand
for a determination by the fact finder whether
SPR had a duty to share in the losses of the project. n9
n9 SPR would have us rule as a matter of law that it had no duty to share in
the losses and was therefore not a joint
venturer with Broadstone. Even if we
were ^o agree that the affidavits and undisputed facts entitled SPR to that conclusion as a matter of law-which we do
not—SPR did not file a cross-motion for
summary judgment, and we would therefore be procedurally constrained from entering judgment in its favor on this issue
in any event.
[**17]

II. Timeliness of Ellsworth's Mechanic's
Lien
[*P19] SPR argues that the trial court
erred when it determined on summary judgment that Ellsworth's mechanic's lien was
timely filed on November 16, 2001. Specifically, SPR claims the trial court erred in concluding that there was nontrivial, substantial
work performed on Building I and Building II
in September 2001 and October 2001 at "the
request of Broadstone and/or SPR" and that the
ninety-day filing period did not begin to run
until that work was completed. SPR asserts that
there were, on the record before the court,
genuine issues of material fact concerning
whether the Building I contract was completed
by May 2001, whether the Building II contract
was completed by July 2001, and whether any
work performed after these dates fell within the
scope of the original building contracts and was
substantial enough to preclude the start of the
ninety-day filing period. Likewise, SPR contends there is a question of material fact concerning when the owner's acceptance of Ellsworth's work occurred. We agree with SPR that
summary judgment on these issues was also
improperly granted.
[*P20] "Utah courts have articulated a
test" for determining
two-prong [**18]
whether a mechanic's lien has been timely filed.
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander
& Smith Assocs., 827 P. 2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992). Under the two-part test, "completion," as it appears in the applicable statute, see
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a) (2005), occurs
when (1) the work under the contract "has been
'substantially completed,' leaving only minor or
trivial work to be accomplished," and (2) the
work '"has been accepted by the owner.'" Interiors, 827 P.2d at 965 (citations omitted). "The
decision as to whether the work at issue is substantial or trivial is fact sensitive," id. at 966,
and "generally it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the additional work was trivial
or minor." Carlisle v. Cox, 29 Utah 2d 136, 506

P.2d 60, 62 (1973), Likewise, the question of
owner acceptance is often fact dependent, especially where the owner is alleged to have withheld acceptance until certain remaining items
of work were completed. See Interiors, 827
P.2d at 967-69, Of course, if the record is clear
and the facts are undisputed, [**19] those
questions may be determined as a matter of
law. See Carlisle, 506 P. 2d at 62. Such, however, is not the case here.
[*P21] While it appears to be undisputed
that some work continued on Building I and
Building II after May 2001 and July 2001, respectively, both parties presented evidence on
summary judgment that supported conflicting
completion dates and cast doubt on the scope of
the work performed on or after August 15,
2001-ninety days before Ellsworth filed its
mechanic's lien. When we view all of the facts
and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to SPR's position, see Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, 2000 UT 71, P15, 10 P.3d 338; Beehive
Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827,
831 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), we conclude that
there is a dispute of fact concerning (1) the date
the buildings were completed, (2) the nature
and scope of work performed on Building I after May 2001 and on Building II after July
2001, and (3) when owner acceptance occurred.
[*P22] The fact that SPR can point to
documents wherein Ellsworth certified that the
entire Building I contract was 100% [**20]
complete in May 2001 and that a subcontract
was 100% complete in March 2001-the same
subcontract on which Ellsworth relies to contend that work wpas still being performed on
Building I as late as September 200Inadequately puts into dispute Ellsworth's "living,
breathing witness testimony" that "extensive
work after the dates of substantial completion"
and "after the date of [Ellsworth's] invoices"
was performed pursuant to the original contract. It also raises questions about the nature
and triviality of work performed on Building I

after those dates. Moreover, SPR raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding the substantial or trivial nature of the work performed on
Building I when any work performed after May
2001 is considered in light of the total contract
price. See Interiors, 827 P.2d at 967 (approving trial court's conclusion that substantial
completion had occurred where work performed after the completion date had a de
minimis dollar value in comparison to the total
contract price); Carlisle, 506 P. 2d at 62 (same).
[*P23] In addition, evidence that Ellsworth certified that the Building II contract was
100% complete in July 2001 [**21] and that
its subcontractors' invoices reflecting that they
had completed all their work by July 2001even though the same subcontractors performed
more work on Building II after July 2001 —
raises a genuine issue of material fact concerning when substantial completion occurred. This
determination is especially unclear in light of
evidence SPR advanced to show the minimal
value of the work performed after July 2001.
[*P24] Ellsworth asserts that SPR's contentions should fail "in the face of compelling—
if not overwhelming-evidence that contravenes
[SPR's] conclusory contentions" and "in the
face of extensive testimony by subcontractors
and [Ellsworth] that they were all performing
thousands-perhaps tens of thousands—of dollars of work on the project during the months of
August, September and October." Ellsworth's
assertions are unavailing, however, since summary judgment cannot be granted based on the
credibility and weight of the parties' respective
evidence. See Lamb v. B & B Amusements
Corp., 869 P2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) (stating
that the evidence presented on summary judgment "may be used only to determine whether a
material issue of fact exists, not [**22] to determine whether one party's case is less persuasive than another's or is not likely to succeed in
a trial on the merits"). nlO On the contrary,
"[t]rial courts must avoid weighing evidence
and assessing credibility when ruling on mo-

tions for summary judgment." n i l Trujillo v.
Utah Dep't of Tramp., 1999 UT App 227\ P42,
986 P. 2d 752. As noted above, to oppose a motion for summary judgment a party Mis required
only to show that there is a material issue of
fact," and not to show that "one party's case is
less persuasive than another's or is not likely to
succeed in a trial on the merits." Lamb, 869
P. 2d at 928. We therefore reverse the court's
judgment on this issue and remand for appropriate reconsideration of the issue of lien timeliness.
nlO This familiar pronouncement is
contrary to a startling statement by Professor David A. Thomas that a Utah Supreme Court case, McBride v. Jones, 615
P.2d 431 (Utah 1980), supports the
proposition that "[e]ven if the averments
of the parties are in disagreement, summary judgment can be granted based on
the credibility of the parties' respective
evidence." David A. Thomas, Utah Civil
Practice § 8.14[5][c][i], at 8-102 (2005).
But the Supreme Court's treatment of the
trial court's grant of summary dismissal
in McBride actually stands for quite the
opposite proposition. See 615 P. 2d at
432-34.
[**23]

nl 1 The trial court's summary judgment ruling includes "Findings" that, indeed, appear to be true findings of fact
reached by weighing evidence and assessing credibility rather than the misnomer we often see employed in a written ruling on summary judgment, where
what is really a recitation of undisputed
facts will appear under the heading
"Findings."

III. Ellsworth's Inclusion of $ 78,000 in its
Lien Claim
[*P25] Both parties appeal the trial court's
ruling concerning $ 78,000 Ellsworth included
in its lien claim. Ellsworth contends that since
it was entitled to claim the $ 78,000 as part of
its lien claim, the trial court erred in not awarding the $ 78,000 as part of its lien and contract
claims. SPR contends that the trial court erred
in not holding Ellsworth liable under Utah's
abusive lien statute for including the $ 78,000
in its lien claim on the Northshore Property for
work performed on an unrelated piece of property. We take up each contention in turn.
A. Ellsworth's claim to the $ 78,000
[*P26] Ellsworth argues that the trial court
erred by not holding SPR liable to pay [**24]
Ellsworth the $ 78,000, advancing several theories on appeal in support of its contention. We
conclude, however, that the trial court was correct. Given the trial court's findings and conclusions, Ellsworth is not entitled to recover the $
78,000 under any of the theories advanced. The
trial court explicitly found that Ellsworth paid
the $ 78,000 to Hatch for work on the proposed
development of a different piece of property,
that it did not relate to Hatch's agreements with
Mr. Chimento and SPR for the construction of
Building I and Building II, and that Broadstone
was responsible for repaying the amount to
Ellsworth. Ellsworth has made no earnest attempt on appeal to challenge the trial court's
findings concerning the $ 78,000. See Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, PI9, 100 P.3d i n ("In
order to establish that a particular finding of
fact is clearly erroneous, '[a]n appellant must
marshal the evidence in support of the findings
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence,
the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence.'") (citation omitted).
[*P27] The plain language of the Mechanics' Liens statute makes [**25] clear that Ellsworth was only entitled to record or file a "lien

upon the property upon or concerning which [it
has] rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or equipment for the
value of the service rendered, labor performed,
or materials or equipment furnished or rented."
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (2005). Although
Ellsworth would be entitled to file a lien for
services rendered even if the planned development never occured, the lien must nevertheless
be filed against "the property concerning which
[it] has rendered professional service." Zions
First Natl Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395,
464 P.2d 387, 388 (1970). Given that the trial
court found the $ 78,000 was not related to the
Northshore Property, but rather to another of
Hatch's projects, Ellsworth was not entitled to
include the $ 78,000 as part of its lien on the
Northshore Property.
[*P28] Ellsworth insists, however, that the
trial court's findings do not prevent the conclusion that when Hatch signed a change order
indicating that the $ 78,000 was to be part of
the Building II contract, Hatch made the $
78,000 a "partnership" debt, for which SPR
[**26] should be equally responsible. But even
assuming that a joint venture existed between
Hatch and SPR, the trial court's findings prevent imposing liability on SPR for the change
order.
[*P29] It is true that "[e]very partner is an
agent of the partnership for the purpose of its
business, and the act of every partner . . . binds
the partnership," Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-6(1)
(2002), but that binding authority does not extend to "[a]n act of a partner which is not apparently for the carrying on of the business of
the partnership in the usual way." Id. § 48-16(2). The business of this alleged partnership or
joint venture was the development of the
Northshore Property. And the findings are clear
that the $ 78,000 was unrelated to the Northshore Property and not part of the Agreement
between Hatch and SPR. By the trial court's
findings, then, the $ 78,000 was for use on another of Hatch's own business undertakings,

completely unrelated to the Northshore Property. Absent some showing that the trial court's
findings in this regard were incorrect and absent an affirmative finding that the $ 78,000
was indeed related to the business of this alleged partnership, [**27] Hatch's act of signing a change order in an apparent attempt to
make his unrelated obligation part of the partnership business has no binding effect on SPR
under partnership law. nl2 See id. We therefore
decline to disturb the trial court's findings and
conclusions concerning Ellsworth's inclusion of
this $ 78,000 in its lien claim.

nl2 A more simplistic example may
help to explain our analysis: Aimee and
Brian form a partnership in order to purchase and develop property into a strip
mall Aimee and Brian contract with
general contractor Catherine to develop
the land. Construction progresses as expected with Aimee and Brian signing
various change orders throughout the
project. During the construction, Brian
offers to buy a pair of skis that he notices
on Catherine's truck. Catherine is willing
to sell them, and she and Brian decide on
a price of $ 500. Brian, a little short on
cash, memorializes the deal on a change
order form, assuring Catherine she will
be paid in due course. Toward the end of
construction, Brian loots the remaining
construction loan funds and absconds to
Venezuela, taking with him the skis for
which he neve. naid. Aimee is unable to
pay the outstanding draw requests and
Catherine files a mechanic's lien on the
property and institutes a breach of contract action and an action to foreclose the
lien. Catherine includes the $ 500 change
order amount for the skis in her lien
claim and also seeks recovery of the $
500 from Aimee as a partnership debt.
Clearly, Catherine is not entitled to recover the $ 500 as part of her lien or

from Aimee as a partnership debt. Although a little more involved than the
simple purchase of a pair of skis for $
500, the situation is essentially the same
here given the trial court's unchallenged
findings.
[**28]
B. Violation of Utah's Abusive Lien Statute
[*P30] The question remains whether the
trial court properly concluded that Ellsworth
did not violate Utah's abusive lien statute by
including $ 78,000 as part of its lien claim
when the trial court ultimately held that Ellsworth was not entitled to do so. The trial court
concluded that although Ellsworth was not entitled to include the $ 78,000 amount in its lien
claim, it "acted in good faith in claiming the $
78,000." The court found that Ellsworth had
filed the lien pursuant to Hatch's change order
and Hatch's instructions, and that Ellsworth did
not cause the lien to be filed with an intent to
cloud the title of the property, to exact more
than it believed was due, or to procure an unjustified advantage. SPR contends the abusive
lien statute does not condition liability on a lien
claimant's subjective belief that it is seeking
more than is due and does not require a showing that the lien claimant specifically intended
to exact more than is due. Thus, SPR contends
that Ellsworth should have been penalized under the abusive lien statute for including $
78,000 more in its lien claim than it was legitimately owed for work on the Northshore
[**29] Property. We disag^e.
[*P31] The abusive lien statute provides
that "[a]ny person entitled to record or file a
lien under Section 38-1-3 is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor who intentionally causes a claim
of lien against any property, which contains a
greater demand than the sum due to be recorded or filed" and the person does so "(a)
with the intent to cloud the title; (b) to exact
from the owner or person liable by means of
the excessive claim of lien more than is due; or

(c) to procure any unjustified advantage or
benefit." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25(1) (2005).
nl3 The statute is peculiarly phrased, in that
while the language of subsection (1) provides
that the lien claimant must intentionally cause a
lien to be filed that demands more that the lien
claimant is due, one of the subsections provides
a further requirement concerning mental state
while the other two do not. Thus, subsection
(l)(a) speaks of "the intent to cloud the title,"
while subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c) do not further prescribe what culpable mental state the
lien claimant must have with respect to filing
the lien "to exact . . . more than is due" or "to
procure any unjustified [**30] advantage or
benefit." Id. But the abusive lien statute is a
criminal statute and it does not "clearly indicate]] a legislative purpose" to impose strict
liability for the crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2102 (2003). As a result, the default culpable
mental state of "intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility" under the last two variants of the abusive lien statute. nl4 Id.

nl3 Besides the bite the criminal
penalty puts into the abusive lien statute,
a person who violates the statute is also
liable "to the owner of the property or an
original contractor or subcontractor who
is affected by the lien for the greater of
double the amount by which the lien exceeds what is actually due, or the actual
damages incurred. Utah Code Ann. § 381-25(2) (2005).
nl4 Construing the abusive lien statute in this manner comports with the
"fair import" of the statute's terms and
"the objects of the law." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-106 (2003). Moreover, it assures
that the abusive lien statute continues "to
discourage outrageous lien claims," J.
PochynokCo. v. Smedsrud, 2003 UTApp
375, PI9, 80 P.3d 563, rev'd on other

grounds, 2005 UT 39, 116 P. 3d 353, and
"abuse of the lien process by creating a
strong disincentive for a would-be litigant to wrongly inflict a mechanic's lien
on a property owner whose property was
not actually enhanced," A.K. & R.
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy,
2004 UT 47, P24, 94 P.3d 270, without
chilling a legitimate lien claimant's right
to file a mechanic's lien for any amount
that may be due. Thus, lien claimants
need to be wary of using the mechanic's
lien process to intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly seek more than they are
due, or to push some other abusive advantage. But where a lien proves to have
been overstated for some other reason
that does not violate the abusive lien
statute, claimants need not fear the
criminal liability or civil penalties the
statute imposes.
[**31]
[*P32] The trial court specifically found
that Ellsworth "did not cause the lien to be filed
with the intent to cloud the property to exact
more than it believed was due or procure an
unjustified advantage." Although SPR contends
that this finding is immaterial because the abusive lien statute does not require a showing of
an intent "to exact . . . by means of the excessive claim of lien more than is due," Utah Code
Ann. § 38-l-25(l)(b), given our application of
the default culpable mental state as explained
above the finding is pertinent to the trial
court's holding. Despite SPR's thorough efforts
to marshal the evidence and challenge several
of the trial court's findings, SPR has not established that these findings are clearly erroneous.
See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, P19, 100
P. 3d 1177. Although SPR asserts that its difficultly in marshaling the evidence supporting a
finding of no intent typifies the problem inherent in proving a negative, SPR has ignored evidence that supports the inference that Ellsworth
did not intentionally, or even recklessly, in-

clude the $ 78,000 to exact more than it believed it was due.
[*P33]
[**32] Ellsworth relied on
Hatch's signed change order referencing the
Northshore Property as providing a contractual
basis under which it could include the $ 78,000
in its lien claim on the Northshore Property.
While Ellsworth's reliance ultimately has
proven to be incorrect, it at least provides evidence that tends to support the finding that
Ellsworth included the amount based on what it
thought was a legitimate and binding change
order and did not intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly include the amount to exact more
than was due.
[*P34] Although SPR points to other evidence giving rise to inferences about what
Ellsworth knew or did not know about the $
78,000, we are not convinced that the trial
court's finding was clearly erroneous. Thus,
although Ellsworth "intentionally cause[d] a
claim of lien . . . which contain[ed] a greater
demand than the sum due to be recorded or
filed," it did not do so with the requisite culpable mental state to cloud the title, to exact from
the owner more than was due, or to procure
some other unjustified advantage.
IV. Lien Waivers
[*P35] We next consider two aspects of
the applicability of the lien waivers at issue in
this case. With [**33] respect to both, we remand for further consideration.
A. Application of Lien Waivers
[*P36] SPR argues that the trial court
erred by ultimately not applying the lien waivers after correctly concluding before trial that
the lien waivers were valid and enforceable.
nl5 We admit we are slightly puzzled by the
trial court's handling of the lien waiver issue,
especially since neither party points us to a
clear finding or explanation concerning why
none of the lien waivers, held to be valid and
enforceable in the abstract, were made applica-

ble by the trial court. Indeed, both sides assert
different draw dates that are supposed to have
cut off Ellsworth's lien rights for work performed prior to those dates. SPR asserts dates
(April 11 and June 25, 2001) that if found to be
the draw dates would indeed waive Ellsworth's
right to file a lien for some portions of the work
it claimed in its mechanic's lien. The draw
dates on which Ellsworth relies (each sometime
in February 2001) would support the conclusion that no portion of its lien claim was
waived by the April and June checks to which
SPR cites in support of its position.

nl5 On summary judgment, the trial
court deemed the lien waivers applicable
and held with respect to the lien waiver
language that

[b]y endorsing the Central
Bank checks, Ellsworth . . .
waived [its] claims and lien
rights for work performed
prior to the date that [its]
draws were requested, but
not for work performed subsequently. The date of the
draw request is the date on
which [Ellsworth] requested
the draw, not the date the
check was received or
cashed.

This ruling was not challenged on appeal.
[**34]
[*P37] Despite Ellsworth's contention that
the trial court "implicitly" found at trial that
there was no portion of the lien claim that was
waived by the April and June checks, and despite its assertion that it put on extensive evidence supporting such a finding, the conflicting

evidence and the lack of a clear ruling by the
trial court prevents us from subscribing to
Ellsworth's position. We therefore remand the
issue for the trial court to clarify its treatment
of the valid lien waivers and to make related
findings relevant thereto.
B. Indemnity, Warranty, and Guaranty
Language of the Lien Waiver Provisions
[*P38] We reverse the trial court's summary judgment ruling that, although the lien
waivers were otherwise valid and enforceable,
the indemnity language in the lien waiver provisions was "inapplicable, invalid and unenforceable." We give no particular deference to a
trial court's interpretation of unambiguous contract language on summary judgment. See
Meadow Valley Contrs., Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 2001 UTApp 190, PI3, 27 P.3d
594. As the lien waiver provisions are contractual in nature, when interpreting their language
we "look[] at [**35] the entire contract and all
of its parts in relation to each other, giving an
objective and reasonable construction to the
contract as a whole." Sears v. Riemersma, 655
P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah 1982). The trial court's
yiew of what was required in order for the indemnity language to be applicable misconstrued its purpose in the lien waiver provision
and unreasonably read the indemnity language
out of the lien waivers. Likewise, when the
guaranty and warranty language of the lien
waiver provisions is properly construed in the
context of the lien waiver agreement, those
provisions are also valid and enforceable.
[*P39] Here, as part of the valid lien
waiver provisions, the applicability of the indemnity and guaranty language hinges on the
relevant draw dates for each check, as is so
with the specific lien waiver language itself.
Under the plain language of the lien waiver
provisions, when construed together as a
whole, the M[p]ayee warrants and guarantees"
that through the draw dates "payment in full
has been made . . . to the suppliers of all labor
and materials to the Property incurred at the

insistence of payee." To the extent "any liens or
claims" are "made [**36] against the Property
by any supplier of labor [or] material" provided
up through the relevant draw date, the payee,
by signing the lien waiver provision, "agrees to
indemnify and hold harmless the owner of the
Property . . . from any loss, claims, or expenses
incurred by [the Property owner] by reason of
or rising out of any liens or claims made
against the Property." Thus, as with the question of whether Ellsworth has waived any
amounts contained in its mechanic's lien claim,
whether Ellsworth must indemnify SPR for any
of the lien claims brought against it by Ellsworth's subcontractors and suppliers depends
on whether any of those liens arose out of work
performed before the draw date of a specific
check that Ellsworth signed and also guarantied
that it had paid. As to any such lien or claim,
Ellsworth would be responsible for the payment by way of its guaranty and its agreement
to indemnify the Property owner therefor. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to
make any additional findings necessary to determine the effect, if any, the indemnity, warranty, and guaranty language has on the liens
filed against the Northshore Property and to
determine any relief to which SPR [**37] may
be entitled under those provisions.
V. Prejudgment Interest
[*P40] Ellsworth appeals the trial court's
prejudgment interest determination. While we
need not address this issue as our decision today reverses the final judgment in several respects and remands several issues for the trial
court's further consideration, we nonetheless
choose to treat the prejudgment interest issue
here because it could well arise again during
the proceedings on remand. See Pair v. Axiom
Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, P22, 20 P.3d 388
("[W]here an appellate court finds that it is
necessary to remand a case for further proceedings, it has the duty of 'pass[ing] on matters
which may then become material.'") (citation
omitted).

[*P41] Ellsworth argues that the trial court
erred in refusing to award Ellsworth interest on
the amounts of the three final payment applications as part of the prejudgment interest award.
The trial court held that because it was undisputed that Ellsworth never submitted the three
applications to anyone for payment, it was "not
possible for the [c]ourt to set a specific date on
which payment of the three unsubmitted applications became due," [**38] and it refused to
"simply 'pick a date' from which interest
beg[an] to accrue." Ellsworth argues that because the terms of its contract with Broadstone
provide for contractual interest to accrue, it was
entitled to interest accrued on the amounts of
these three payment applications.
[*P42] Ellsworth's contention that the trial
court's ruling appears to blur the distinction between the requirements for receiving an award
of contractual interest and those for receiving
an award of prejudgment interest as a matter of
damages is well taken. See Consolidation Coal
Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry,
886 P.2d 514, 528 n.23 (Utah 1994) ('"A distinction exists between interest stated by the
terms of a contract to be paid before its breach
and interest recoverable by way of damages
after a breach, although the term "interest" is
often used indiscriminately to describe both
amounts.'") (citation omitted). "Prejudgment
interest may be awarded in a case where the
loss is fixed as of a particular time and the
amount of the loss can be calculated with
mathematical accuracy," Jorgensen v. John
Clay & Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (*Jtah 1983),
which makes [**39] such an award discretionary and dependent on finding that the debt was
or became liquidated. See Bjork v. April Indus.,
Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah) (stating general
requirements for receiving an award of prejudgment interest), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930,
97 S Ct. 2634, 53 L Ed 2d 245 (1977). In contrast, "'[contractual interest is the creature of
contract and is recoverable only as provided by
its terms.'" Consolidation Coal, 886 P.2d at
528 n.23 (citation omitted). Where an agree-

merit provides for contractual interest to accrue,
that interest becomes "an integral part of the
debt as the principal itself/1 Farnworth v. Jensen, 117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d 571, 575 (1950)
(internal quotations, citation, and emphasis
omitted), and it is not discretionarily awarded.
See Utah Code Ann. § 15-l-4(2)(a) (2005)
("[A] judgment rendered on a lawful contract
shall conform to the contract and shall bear the
interest agreed upon by the partiesf.]").
[*P43] The difficulty we have here with
the trial court's treatment of the prejudgment
interest issue is that, while explicitly holding
that Ellsworth was [**40] "entitled to prejudgment contractual interest on its breach of
contract claim as requested," the trial court
nevertheless refused to award interest attributable to the three payment applications. It is not
clear whether the trial court did so because under the general rules governing prejudgment
interest the amounts due on the three payment
applications were not liquidated, or whether the
trial court determined that under the terms of
the contract Ellsworth was not entitled to contractual interest on the three payment applications because it never submitted them for payment.
[*P44] It may very well be that under the
terms of the contract Ellsworth is not entitled to
interest on the payment applications because
they were never submitted. The contract states,
with our emphasis, that interest is to accrue at
M
[t]en percent (10%) per annum thirty (30) days
after the date of the Invoice for payment."
Since it was undisputed that Ellsworth never
submitted the three applications, there appears
to be no "date of the Invoice for payment" that
marks the beginning of the thirty-day period
before interest would begin to accrue, which
under the plain language of the contract suggests [**41] that contractual interest on those
applications would be inappropriate. See Consolidation Coal, 886 P. 2d at 528 n.23. Yet if,
as Ellsworth contends, the payment applications were never submitted because Hatch had

disappeared and there was no one to whom
they could have been submitted-and it appears
to be somewhat disputed whether Ellsworth
could have found Hatch and submitted the three
payment applications-that may have bearing
on whether Ellsworth may still recover interest
under the contract.
VI. Attorney Fees
[*P45] SPR appeals from the trial court's
award of attorney fees below, and Ellsworth
requests we grant it attorney fees on appeal.
Given our reversal of several of the trial court's
rulings and given our remand, we must vacate
the trial court's award of attorney fees because
it is no longer clear who the prevailing party is.
However, as was the case with the prejudgment
interest issue, the attorney fee issue will present
itself again on remand and requires brief comment.
[*P46] It is clear that Utah law requires
the prevailing party, and ultimately the court, to
allocate the prevailing party's attorney fees
among those claims for which it is [**42] entitled to an award of attorney fees and those for
which it is not. See A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App
87, P32, 977 P.2d 518, cert, denied, 994 P2d
1271 (Utah 1999). SPR argues that because
Ellsworth is not entitled under the contract to
attorney fees for its breach of contract claimthe contract contained no attorney fees provision—Ellsworth and the trial court failed to
properly allocate those noncompensable attorney fees related to the breach of contract claim
and those compensable fees related to the mechanic's lien claim.
[*P47] While it is true that under the mechanic's lien statute Ellsworth is not entitled "to
attorney fees incurred in pursuing its nonlien
claims which were 'completely separate,'"
American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems
Commun. Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 193 (Utah Ct
App. 1997) (citation omitted), the breach of
contract claim here was so inextricably tied to

the mechanic's lien claim as to warrant grouping these fees together. Indeed, it almost goes
without saying that a breach of contract claim
is typically such an integral part of a mechanic's lien claim that a party [**43] cannot
pursue such a claim without also proving the
existence of a contract, a payment due under
the contract, and a breach of that contract by
nonpayment.
CONCLUSION
[*P48] We remand this matter to the trial
court for further consideration in accordance
with this opinion.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
[*P49] WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
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THIS ADDINOUM # 2 TO REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT BETWEEN
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LLC AND 51 SOUTH PORTLAND RIALTY CORP. DATED
JUNE IS, 2000
RE;

Auto Mall Development

The terms and conditions of this Addendum #2 are hereby incorporated in the above
Real Estate Purchase Contract as if set forth et length therein.
This memorandum shall summahre the terms of the agreements reached regarding the
above development project and set forth the same in contractual form, Intending to bind the
parties w*th regard thereto, as dosing of title on the real astate is needed by 6/15/00;
thereafter more detailed agreements in appropriate form will be prepared *nd executed
reflecting the following terms:
- Utah title company as nominee for 51 South Portland Realty,
, a New York
corporation (Chimento), and
, a Utah LLC fUtah LLC) (Guy Hatch and
, his
partner will own this, see below as to restrictions,) will acquire tide as ten$nts*ln*cornmon (with
a 50% interest wi each) to the entire 6.58 acre parcel from Ford investment Enterprises
Corpc ation for the purchase prirr of $1,750,000.00 (the "Land"),
- Chimento will contribute as capital to the project the sum of $2,900,000.00 to be
transferred to and held by Utah Title Company as a Qualified Intermediary f QO and applied
as follows:
$1,750,000 •
5,000(7) 87,000 545,000
•

fiUQWH Total

to purchase
To costs of purchase
Commission to Re Max
To site Improvement costs
To building construction costs (see following)

; %900,ooo

- Utah LLC $h*X be the project manager In charge of obtaining remaining needed
construction financing and Institutional permanent financing for Buildings I and U (hereinafter
"office buildings"), construction supervision, liasing of the buildings, sate of the station/store
site, and operation of the venture. Utah LLC wH receive a fte of $135,000.00 for such services,
payable in three installments of $45,000.00 on July 15, 2000, September 1, 2000 end October
15, 2000.
- Utah LLC will provide financing for needed construction monies for the office butfdtng
and remaining cash needs of the project, Guy Hatch will guaranty such nnatxjng.
- Chimento will execute mortgage as to its tenancy »n common interest to secure
institutional construction financing but wiH not be obligated on any Note or by way of guarantee
at an/ time
- Chimento funds for site development ^ construction costs "bard" costs only not
"soft" costs except the Utah LLC fees or interest) will be utihxed prior to any other construction
C\Xt OOCVkfttO JV*T>t*Lft5r KI31W%HOJX>C

<3V
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financing, on a standard draw schedule wrth 10% r e t a i n s (inclusive), to be rtltased by QI
after inspection approval by a Chimento engineer to be retained by Chimento and paid as a
project cost
* Utah LLC shall be a singte meittber, single purpose LLC satisfactory to NJ counsel for
Chimento whose ownership interest and control shall be pledged to Chimento to secure Utah
LLC's and Hatch's obligations, with a restriction agreement in recordablf form satisfactory to NJ
counsel In favor of Chimento as to the LLC and the LLC's tenancy in common interest in the
land,
- Utah LLC shall mortgage its tenancy in common interest in the land to CWmehto to
secure the pledge and restriction agreements as well Hatch's obligations pursuant to this
memo. Chimento shall subordinate its mortgage only with respect to institutional constructs
financing. Chimento win release this mortgage will be released upon completion of the project
and dosing of permanent institutional financing.
Note: Chlmento's acquisition of its interest in the project is through a "Uke-Kind" exchange and
where the term Chimento fc used, QI shall act as Chimeric's nominee until Chimento may take
title pursuant to IR5 regulations.
The parties intend that following completion of the project and at the time of permanent
financing but not earlier than 1/1/2001, as they may hereafter agree, Chimento and Utah LLC
may transfer their interests to a new Utah LLC to be owned equaty by them, otherwise
consistent with the terms of this memo, but in any event the project shaH be held for
investment and all actions by the parties? shall be In furtherance of that goal. (New Utah LLC
documents to be satisfactory to NJ counsel for Chimento).
- The development project shall bt on a cash basis with a calendar year end.
- Chimento shall rtcervt a 10% return on Ks capital commencing December 1, 2000
through the end of the first year following dosing on the u n d , to be paid monthly connmencing
on 1/1/2001. Hatch shall guaranty such return, to be p3td from operating income of the project
if sufficient, and if not# then from proceeds of sale of a portion of the land - the
rtatton/conveoience mart, if any, Utah LLC shall contribute any and all sums to the project
needed for payment of such return.
- Any net operating income remaining in the first year, to Hatch.
• Chimento shall have the option to receive a 10% return on its capital for a second year
on terms set forth above for yew l, or to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project for
the year following dosing on the Land.
- Thereafte.' Chimento and Utah, LLC shall share SO/SO tn net operating income of the
project.
- Permanent financing w •* "take out" all financed construction costs (including soft costs
and leasing costs) (No brokerage «s to be paid to Hatch or affiliated entities) ^ the project or
buildings individual w* secure the same if financed as to the whole or individually. The parties
agree to consult es to the amount of permanent financing which may exceed the above and, if

«alA
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agreed, such excess to be applied as follows: to Chimento to reimburse in the following order
at availably (i) land closing costs; (il) allocated construction costs, i.e. building l and Uilldlng
2; (ill) allocated site improvement costs, i.e., building 1 and building 2; and (iv) allocated fend
costs, i.e. building l *rvd 2; and after Oiknento capital repaid In full, ID each 50/50.
- Subsequent capfol transactions (refinances, safes, casualty or cor>demnatk>n) after
debt repayment to: (i) remaining unpaid chimento capital; and thereafter (ii) to each 50/50.
Distributions of net operating Income after completion of construction, to be made not less than
quarterly.
Distribution from capft*! transactions no later than 20 days after receipt.
All decisions regarding the project shall be mutually made *fter consultation.
Monthly construcboo and leasing reports to be submitted by Hatch.
Quarterly statements to be submitted within 30 fays of close of quarter.
Year end statements to be submitted within 45 days of dose of year.
Tax ret^ns to be prepared, and delivered to tenants-ln-common within 75 days of close of

Surh returns shall reflect Uud the property is heW as tenanU^n-common interests m d not as a
partnership. All such elections steH be made to be consistent with this.
Hatch's development entity (not Utah LLC) shall enter Into a consulting agreement with
CNroentos, individually, wfch regard to property development Inclusive of the project, to a term
running through March 1, 2001, for a fee of $24,000,00 ptc month payable montNy
commencing July 1, 2000 (except the July 1, 200Q payment shall be $12,00000).
The provisions of this Addendum shaH survive closing of title.

5 1 SOUTH PORTLAND WEALTY CORP.

&ROADSTONE XNV*STMENTS, L l C

C*JY J K X T U M ^ V ^ w T M i r i . t t * Mt»S\M*KO.DOC
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Mark L. Poulsen (5424)
NELSON, SNUFFER,
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Fax: (801)576-1960
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL
Plaintiff,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST 51-SPR ON ISSUE OF
LIABILITY AS JOINT
vs.
VENTURER WITH AND
PARTNER OF BROADSTONE
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah
limited liability company; CENTRAL BANK, a
Utah banking corporation; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a
Utah limited liability company; ALLSTATE
Civil No. 020400442
ELECTRIC, a Utah corporation; HUBS TILE,
INC., a Utah corporation; WESTWOOD MILL
Civil No. 010405059
& CABINET, INC., a Utah corporation;
DEBRA A. BURNETT and MICHAEL L.
Consolidated into
BURNETT, dba ALARM TECH;
Civil No. 010405059
HALVERSON MECHANICAL, INC., a Utah
corporation; MASCO CONTRACTOR
Judge Schofield
SERVICES CENTRAL, INC., a Utah
corporation dba HANSEN-ALL SEASONS
INSULATION; DECORATIVE
LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah corporation; the
DAN PARKINSON FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; Guy HATCH, an individual;
JOHN DOES 1-20 and all other persons
unknown claiming any interest to the subject
real property,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT to Ellsworth Paulsen
Construction Company on the issue of 51-SPR LLC's liability as joint venturer, partner or successor
in relation to Broadstone Investments, LC based upon a ruling by the Court dated December 30,
2002.
This case is before the court on Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Service's ("EPCO") May 24,
2002 motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendant 51-SPR-LLC's ("51-SPR" or
"Chimento") liability as a joint venturer, partner, or successor in relation to Broadstone Investments,
LC ("Broadstone").1 51-SPR opposes the motion.
Having reviewed the parties' respective memoranda, and the evidence on file, and heard oral
argument on the matter, I now issue this ruling granting the motion.
In essence, EPCO asserts that it has not been paid certain sums due for construction services
performed on the Northshore I and II commercial real estate development project (the "Project")
pursuant to contracts and related change orders signed by Broadstone or its agents. If Broadstone
and 51 -SPR were partners or joint venturers on the Project, 51-SPR is jointly and severally liable for
all debts chargeable to the partnership or joint venture, including the sums due to EPCO under the
contracts to develop the Project. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-10 to -12; Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213,
218 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-10 tp -12).
1

The central issue before the couit has been cast principally as one of joint venture.
However, in footnote 2 of its supplemental supporting memorandum, counsel for EPCO correctly
notes that "partnership law and joint venture law are essentially indistinguishable." (citing
Nupetco Assoc, v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 882 fn. 3 (Utah 1983). See also Utah Code Ann § 481-3.1; Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 218 (Utah App. 1990) ("[§48-1-3.1] provides that joint
ventures are governed by the partnership act.").
9

Summary Judgment Standard.
Summary judgmpnt is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Where the motion for summary judgment is supported by evidence and
sworn testimony, as is the case here, the party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon mere
allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of fact to be tried. See
Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983).
Whether or not there was a joint venture relationship is a factual question. Rogers v. M.O.
Bitner, Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1932 (Utah 1987). However, in this case, where the "facts are not in
dispute . . . the relationship of the parties is a matter of law." Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah
1974).
Joint Venture Factors.
The Utah Code defines "joint venture" as "an association of two or more persons to carry on
as co-owners of a single business enterprise." Utah Code Ann. §48-1-3.1. The Utah Supreme Court
has declared Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974) to be the "leading case in Utah defining the
elements essential to a joint venture." Betenson v. Call Auto & Equipment Sales, 645 P.2d 684,686
(Utah 1982). Bassett states:
A joint venture is an agreement between two or more persons
ordinarily but not necessarily limited to a single transaction for the
purpose of making a profit. The requirements for the relationship are
not exactly defined, but certain elements are essential: The parties
must combine their property, money, effects, skill, labor, and

3

knowledge. AS a general rule, there must be a community of interest
in the performance of the common purpose, a joint proprietary
interest in the subject matter, a mutual right to control, a right to share
in the profits, and unless there is an agreement to the contrary, a duty
to share in any losses which may be sustained.
530 P.2d at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). In Rogers v. M.O. Bitner, the court states that "[a] joint venture
does not always rise pursuant to formal agreement; rather, it is a relationship voluntarily entered by
the parties and may be proven by the actions taken by the parties. The characterizations given by the
parties are certainly not determinative of the issue." 738 P.2d 1029, 1032 (emphasis added).
In this case both the written agreements and the parties' undisputed actions indicate that 51SPR was not merely Broadstone's creditor, but that 51-SPR was actively involved with Broadstone
in the business of developing and maintaining the Project in anticipation of earning a profit. While
Broadstone was the principal supplier of skill, labor, and knowledge as an on-site project manager,
51-SPR was the principal supplier of capital to the venture. Both parties had a common interest
in the Project and each expected to participate in the profits expected to follow.
Background and Addendum #2.
In April 2000, Guy Hatch (of Broadstone) and Chimento met with Ford Motor Company
("Ford") for the purpose of acquiring the real property upon which the Northshore I and H buildings
were constructed. While 51-SPR insists that Hatch met with Ford before Chimento did, Chimento
admits to being involved m the acquisition of the property, in putting it under contract." The real
estate purchase agreement ("RESPA") lists the purchase price of the Northshore property at
$1,750,000.00. On June 12, 2000, Ford conveyed the Northshore property to Broadstone by
warranty deed.
4

It is undisputed that Broadstone and 51 South Portland Realty executed Addendum #2 to the
RESPA (the "Agreement"), labeled "DATED June 15, 2000" at the top of the document. It is also
undisputed that all of 51 South Portland Realty's interest in the Agreement is now owned by 51 -SPR
and that the term "Chimento" in the Agreement refers to 51 South Portland Realty.
The Agreement undisputedly provides that 1) The parties would own the Northshore property
as tenants in common; 2) 51-SPR would contribute $2.9 million, of which $1.75 million would be
used to acquire the land, and another $1.2 million would be applied to site work and construction
costs; 3) Broadstone would be the "project manager," would "operate the venture," would obtain
long term financing, enter into construction contracts, supervise construction, and obtain leases on
the buildings; 4) Chimento would execute a mortgage to secure institutional construction financing;
5) Chimento funds for site development and construction costs ("hard" costs only) would be utilized
"on a standard draw schedule ... after inspection approval by a Chimento engineer"; 6) Broadstone
would be a single member single purpose company, whose "ownership interest and control shall be
pledged to Chimento to secure [its] obligations"; and 7) Broadstone would "mortgage its tenancy in
common interest to Chimento [51]SPR] to secure the pledge and restriction agreements as well [as]
Hatch's obligations."2
The Agreement also provides:
[1] The parties intend that following completion of the project... but not earlier that
1/1/2001, as they may hereafter agree, Chimento and [Broadstone] may transfer their
interests to a new Utah LLC to be owned equally by them, otherwise consistent with
2

See 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial
summary judgment, pp. 8-9^ These are the undisputed characterizations of the items in
Addendum #2.
5

the terms of this memo, but in any event the project shall be held for investment and
all actions by the parties shall be in furtherance of that goal. (Agreement p. 2, 14);
[2] Chimento shall receive a 10% return on its capital commencing December 1,
2000 through the end of the first year following closing . . . to be paid monthly . . .
. Hatch shall guaranty such return, to be paid from operating income of the project,
if sufficient, and if not, then from proceeds of a sale of a portion of the land . . . if
any, [Broadstone} shall contribute any and all sums to the project needed to payment
of such return. (Agreement p.2,16);
[3] Any net operating income remaining in the first year [shall be paid] to Hatch [of
Broadstone]. (Agreement p. 2, f7);
[4] Chimento shall have the option to receive a 10% return on its capital for a second
year on terms set forth above for year 1, or to share 50/50 in net operating income of
the project... (Agreement p. 2, 18);
[5] Thereafter Chimento and [Broadstone] shall share 50/50 in net operating income
of the project. (Agreement p. 2, 16);
[6] Permanent financing will "take out" all financed construction costs... the project
. . . will secure the same . . . . The parties agree to consult as to the amount of
permanent financing which may exceed the above and, if agreed, such excess to be
applied as follows: to Chimento to reimburse the following order as available, (i)
land closing costs; (ii) allocated construction costs, i.e. building 1 and building 2; (iii)
allocated site improvement costs, i.e. building 1 and building 2; and after Chimento
capital repaid in full, to each 50/50. (Agreement p.2, 110;
[7] Subsequent capital transactions (refinances, sales, casualty or condemnation) after
debt repayment to: (i) remaining unpaid Chimento capital; and thereafter (ii) to each
50/50. (Agreement p. 3i 11);
[8] All decisions regarding the project shall be mutually made after consultation.
(Agreement p. 3,13);
[9] Monthly construction and leasing reports to be submitted by Hatch. (Agreement
p. 3,14); and
[10] Hatch development entity (not Utah LLC) shall enter into a consulting
agreement with Chimentos, individually, with regard to property development
inclusive of the project, to a term running through March 1, 2001, for a fee of
6

$24,000.00 per month payable monthly commencing July 1, 2000 (except the July
1 2000 payment shall be $12,000.00. (Agreement p. 3, f 9).
Joint proprietary interest in the subject matter.
While joint tenancy alone does not of itself create a joint venture or partnership,^ 1-SPR's
proprietary interests in the Project severely undermines its assertions that it was merely a "creditor"
or "investor" on the Project. 51-SPR does not dispute that both parties had ownership interests in
the Project, at the outset.4 And since December 13, 2000, 51-SPR has owned the property in fee
simple except for one day.5 It is undisputed that as of November, 2002, "[t]he Northshore building
II is 100% occupied, and the Northshore Building I is approximately 70% occupied [and] 51-SPR
receives about $70,000 per month for tenants, but pays $20,000 or $30,000 to the bank to debt
service the construction loan."6
Mutual right to control.

3

Utah Code Ann. §48-1-4.

4

According to counsel for 51-SPR, "Mr Chimento testified that, after discovering
Broadstone and Hatch's misappropriation, breach of duty, and fraud, he believed that
Broadstone's interest in the property should be surrendered to 50-SPR." 51-SPR's response to
EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial summary judgment, p. 15. However,
"the surrender of Broadstone's interest in the Property has been called into question by Dan
Parkinson." Id. (citing Chimento Aff. at ^25). I note that regardless of the current ownership
Status of the property (at worst 51-SPR retains a one-half interest), the undisputed facts satisfy
the "joint proprietary interest" factor in determining joint venture status.
5

51-SPR does not dispute that at the end of January, 2001, it conveyed the property to
Broadstone and Broadstone reconveyed the Property to 50-SPR the next day. 51-SPR's response
to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial summary judgment, p. 12.
6

W.,p. 16, 111. (citing Chimento Dep. P. 125-26).
7

As an owner of the Project property, 51-SPR had the right to control the activities relating
to the Project. Nothing in the parties' Agreement abrogated 51-SPR's right to control, but only
insured that right. While Broadstone had authority to obtain long term financing, enter into
construction contracts, supervise construction, and obtain leases on the buildings, it was required to
"pledge" its "ownership interest and control . . . to Chimento" (Agreement p. 2, fl) (emphasis
added).7 Significantly, the Agreement provided: "All decisions regarding the project shall be
mutually made after consultation." (Agreement p. 3, |3) (emphasis added).
51-SPR asserts that Chimento rarely visited the construction site, and did not actually
"approve" construction draws, and that he did not believe he had veto power over the tenants on his
property. Even if these assertions are true, the degree of control actually exercised by 51-SPR is not
determinative of the control factor. The terms of the Agreement, together with 51-SPR's ownership
of the property, unquestionably gave 51-SPR the right to exercise mutual control on "all decisions
regarding the project."
In addition, 51-SPR had the right to receive monthly reports from Broadstone under the
Agreement. It is undisputed that Chimento visited the construction site at least six times, and
reviewed leases and construction draws to "keep abreast of the management" of the Project.8 Given
both the terms of the Agreement and the actual control9 exerted by 51-SPR in this case, I simply

7

This suggests that Broadstone was an agent for 51-SPR.

8

51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial
summary judgment, p. 24.
9

Counsel for 51-SPR admits that when 51-SPR "discovered Broadstone's fraud" it then
"executed the Termination of Co-Ownership Agreement" and now collects monthly rents on the
8

cannot credit 51-SPR's conclusory allegation that Broadstone "had sole responsibility and authority
to develop and manage the Property."10
Right to share in the profits.
Utah law provides: "the receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima
facie evidence that he is a partner in the business," Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-4(4). While I do not
address whether "profits" were actually received in this case, the Agreement gave both parties the
right to share in the profits from the Project. The Agreement provided that 51-SPR would receive
a monthly 10% "return on its capital" to be guaranteed by Broadstone. Any net operating income
remaining in the first year would go to Broadstone. The second year, 51-SPR would have the option
to receive a 10% "return on its capital" or to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project.
Thereafter the parties were "to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project." (Agreement p.
2, f 8) (emphasis added). Mr. Chimento himself, acknowledged the 50/50 arrangement in his
deposition.11
A duty to share in any losses which may be sustained.
51-SPR argues that it "never agreed to share in any losses incurred by Broadstone," but that
it "merely agreed to serve as an investor or financier in the development of the Property."12 Mr.

property.
10

51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial
summary judgment, p. 24.
11

Chimento Dep. pp. 137-138.

12

51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial
summary judgment, p. 20.
9

Chimento's affidavit sates: "51-SPR was not liable or responsible for any losses, liabilities, or
responsibilities relating to the Property, and under its arrangement with Broadstone, stood to lose
only its investment in the Property and nothing more."13 While these bald assertions contradict
EPCO's position, they do not create any genuine issue of material fact. 51-SPR's denials of liability
are simply conclusory allegations which are sharply contradicted by both the terms of the Agreement
and the undisputed facts.
The terms of the Agreement, 51-SPR's ownership interest in the Project, and 51-SPR's
undisputed actions all gave rise to 51-SPR's duty to share in any losses which may be sustained by
the Project. There is no indication from the facts that the parties expected the Project to be anything
less than profitable, thus it is no surprise that loss-sharing duties were not spelled out in detail.
However, the Agreement essentially put 51-SPR's $2.9 million immediately at risk should the
venture completely fail. In addition, the Agreement made 51-SPR one-half owner14 of a tenancy in
common with all the accompanying liabilities of a real property owner, including applicable tax and
tort liabilities. The Agreement did not purport to limit Chimento's duty to share losses by providing
that "Chimento will execute mortgage as to its tenancy in common interest to secure institutional
construction financing but will not be obligated on any Note or by way of guarantee at any time."

13

Chimento affidavit, 110.

14

In addition, by its terms, the Agreement required that Broadstone's "ownership interest
and control shall be pledged to Chimento to secure [its] and Hatch's obligations," and that
"[Broadstone] shall mortgage its tenancy in common interest to Chimento . . ." (Agreement, p. 2
n 1-2).
10

(Agreement, p. 1,17) (emphasis added).15 However, 51-SPR apparently ignored or waived this
provision when it agreed with Central Bank in April, 2002 to guarantee "Broadstone's" #4.3 million
construction loans.
Simply put, the Agreement and the undisputed facts demonstrate that this is not a case of 51SPR acting as a simple creditor to Broadstone. 51-SPR insists that it only guaranteed Broadstone's
loans to avoid foreclosure. Onb may wonder, however, whether foreclosure would have been so
great a concern if, as it alleges, 51-SPR was merely a secured creditor in a priority position. In fact,
however, 51-SPR voluntarily conveyed the Project property to Broadstone for one day in January
2001 so that Broadstone could secure additional financing for the Project. In doing so, 51-SPR
voluntarily put its own property at greater risk of loss in furtherance of the joint venture.
The parties' characterizations.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that "[tjhe characterizations given by the parties
are certainly not determinative" of the joint venture relationship. Rogers v. M.O. Bitner, 738 P.2d
1029, 1032. Thus, it is not dispositive to the joint venture or partnership determination that the
Agreement provided that the project would merely be "held for investment" or that the parties' tax
returns would "reflect that the property is held as tenants-in-common interests and not as a
partnership."16 In contrast, 51-SPR's letter written by Robert Chimento to Richard Ellsworth on

15

A partial limitation on 51-SPR's liability for losses would not preclude a finding of
joint venture under the Basset factors. In making the joint venture determination, the duty to
share losses is a factor "unless there is an agreement to the contrary." Bassett v. Baker, P.2d
(emphasis added).
16

Agreement, p. 2, f 4 and p. 3, fj 7-8.
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October 9, 2001 is telling. Mr. Chimento's letter discusses the "handling" of the project by Guy
Hatch and later states:
Please realize that it was never our intent to be late in our payments to anyone, and
we certainly had good reasons to support the statements we made to you that led you
to believe that you would be paid by now. If not for the economic uncertainty
resulting from the 9/11 attacks, our Buyer and/or our permanent financing would
have closed by now.
(emphasis added).
Whether these written statements create partnership by estoppel,17 they demonstrate Mr. Chimento' s
understanding of 51-SPR's joint obligation to EPCO for work performed on the Project.18
CONCLUSION
Based on the undisputed material facts, I grant EPCO's motion for partial summary
judgment. 51-SPR is liable to EPCO as a joint venturer or partner with regard to services rendered
pursuant to the contracts and change orders executed between Broadstone and EPCO relating to the
Project.19

17

See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-13. "When a person by words spoken or written or by
conduct represents himself . . . to anyone as a partner . . . he is liable to any such person to whom
such representation has been made who has on the faith of such representation given credit to the
actual or apparent partnership . .. When a partnership liability results, he is liable as if he were
an actual member of the partnership .. . When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly
with the other persons . . . so consenting to the . . . representation as to incur liability; otherwise
separately." Id.
18

Interestingly, in the same letter, Mr. Chimento suggests that "[a]nother possibility" to
ei.sure EPCO's receipt of payment "is a partnership of some kind." Chimento suggests, "perhaps
we could both make a profit."
19

While I believe it may be possible to conclude that 51-SPR was the principal owner of
the Project with Broadstone merely acting as its agent, I do not make that finding today. Because
I find 51-SPR liable to EPCO as a partner or joint venturer with Broadstone, I do not reach the
12
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 010405059
Judge Gary D. Siott

vs.

BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah
limited liability company; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a
Utah limited liability company;
Defendants.

On December 8, 9, and 10, 2003, this Court conducted a three-day bench trial.
Arguments were presented to the court concerning various motions submitted by Ellsworth
Paulsen Construction Company ("Ellsworth Paulsen"), and 51-SPR LLC ("51-SPR"). At the
trial, the following issues were addressed: (1) the status of certain change orders; (2) abuse of
lien right under U.C.A. §38-1-25; (3) wrongful hen under U.C.A. §38-9-1; (4) contract damages;
and (5) attorney's fees.
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Prior to the trial, both parties submitted memoranda of points and authorities in further
support of their positions. After considering the arguments presented by the parties at the
hearing, the Court requested additional briefing on issues related to Ellsworth Paulsen's
recoverability of the value of extra work and pre-judgment interest calculation. The Court has
considered all memoranda submitted by the parties, the arguments presented at trial, the relevant
case law and statutory provisions, and being fully advised in the matter, issues the following
ruling:

BACKGROUND
51-SPR, as a joint venture with Guy Hatch and Broadstone Investments, L.C.
("Broadstone") entered into an agreement with Ellsworth Paulsen to construct two commercial
buildings, Northshore Building I and Northshore Building II, on real property located in
American Fork, Utah.
Richard Ellsworth has been the sole owner of Ellsworth Paulsen since 1984. Mr.
Ellsworth has his general contractor's license and is an engineer. Guy Hatch was the apparent
owner of the project in question. Prior to the commencement of the project in question, Mr.
Hatch and Ellsworth Paulsen had participated in the construction of a project in American Fork
that consisted of approximately six buildings. Mr. Hatch acted as the construction manager of
the American Fork project and also functioned in that capacity for the North Shore project.
Ellsworth Paulsen contends that the North Shore project was ultimately completed as required
and monies are due and owing from Broadstone and 51-SPR.
To finance construction of Building 1 and Building II, Broadstone obtained construction
loans for each building from Central Bank. During the course of construction, Ellsworth Paulsen
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or Broadstone would submit periodic draw requests to Central Bank requesting payments for
Ellsworth Paulsen and the subcontractors for work performed on the buildings. The
subcontractors, Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate, prepared and submitted draw requests for
Ellsworth Paulsen, and Ellsworth Paulsen prepared comprehensive payment requests which were
submitted to Broadstone. Broadstone then prepared a payment request which was submitted to
Central Bank and Central Bank prepared checks for payment to Ellsworth Paulsen and the
subcontractors. Once the draws were approved, joint checks were issued by Central Bank and
forwarded to Broadstone and Ellsworth Paulsen for disbursement to the respective
subcontractors.
Because the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen were not fully paid for the services
and materials provided to Building 1 and/or Building II, each recorded mechanic's liens against
the property in the office of the Utah County recorder. Ellsworth Paulsen also filed a Notice of
Lien on November 13, 2001 and filed an amended Notice of Lien on November 16, 2001 with
the Utah County Recorder's Office. Ellsworth Paulsen sent a copy of the Notice of Lien filed on
November 16, 2001, to the reputed owner of the property, Broadstone Investments, via certified
mail and to Robert Chimento of 51-SPR via certified mail. Ellsworth Paulsen also filed a timely
lis pendens.
Judge Schofield previously determined that 51-SPR and Broadstone were in a jointventure and that 51-SPR was liable for the amounts owed Ellsworth PauLen, if any, by reason of
its relationship with Broadstone. The parties are well-aware of the historical relationship
between Broadstone and 51-SPR. This Court finds it unnecessary to further recite information
with respect to that relationship and the historical information in the litigation that has brought
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the parties to the time of trial. Rather, this Court focuses specifically on its findings and
decisions as to issues that were addressed at the time of trial.
FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
A.

Change Orders
1.

The balance due and owing on North Shore Building 1 is in the amount of

$199,830.53. The balance due and owing on North Shore Building II is in the amount of
$364,991.26. These amounts are reflected by information contained in Plaintiffs Exhibits 5 and
6, respectively.
2

As to the property referred to as the Williams property, the evidence establishes

that Guy Hatch contacted Mr. Ellsworth showing to him drawings which proposed the
development of the Williams property including Buildings 1 and II on the property in question.
Mr. Hatch, the primary principal and owner of the property for Buildings 1 and II, requested that
Mr. Ellsworth enter into an agreement with him wherein Ellsworth Paulsen paid the sum of
$110,000 to Vintage Construction for what Mr. Ellsworth assumed was to be for engineering
design work and other costs for the Williams property and possibly for Building II.
3.

Ellsworth Paulsen gave a check to Vintage Construction for $110,000 which

included $32,000 for the Broadstone project and $78,000 for the Williams North Shore project.
The evidence establishes that Mr. Hatch did not inform Mr. Ellsworth how the money was to be
used and where the funds were to go. Mr. Ellsworth assumed, based on his conversations with
Mr. Hatch, that the monies would go to those two respective projects. Mr. Hatch instructed Mr.
Ellsworth that a change order for Building II in the amount of $78,000 could be applied in that
fashion.
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4.

As the result of a conversation with Mr. Hatch, Mr. Ellsworth was unsure how the

$78,000 was to be used but was informed that Hubble Engineering would be involved on the
project and Mr. Hatch further represented that Ellsworth Paulsen would be repaid the $78,000.
5.

Mr. Ellsworth paid the $78,000 as per the instruction of Mr. Hatch, without

determining where the money was going and how it was going to be applied to the project. Mr.
Ellsworth relied upon representations of Mr. Hatch, as the owner and construction manager of
the project, as to how the money would be used with assurances that Broadstone would be
responsible for the repayment to Ellsworth Paulsen.
6.

During the course of the project, Mr. Hatch disappeared. Ellsworth Paulsen

attempted to find Mr. Hatch, but for a significant period of time was unable to do so. As of
November 2001, Ellsworth Paulsen became aware that 51-SPR was somehow involved in the
project, but did not know their status or relationship with Mr. Hatch. Mr. Hatch was eventually
found by representatives of Ellsworth Paulsen to be living in Hawaii. A number of change
orders had been requested by Mr. Hatch for the project in question; the work had been done by
Ellsworth Paulsen, and yet the change orders had not been signed. Eventually, Mr. Hatch agreed
to sign all the change orders sent to him in Hawaii for that purpose.
7.

The evidence establishes that Mr. Hatch would directly contact the subcontractors

working on the project, in most instances without first communicating with Ellsworth Paulsen,
and would make requests for changes. The work and changes requested by Mr. Hatch were
completed and in many cases Ellsworth Paulsen found out about the changes after the fact.
8.

The evidence establishes that all of the requests for change orders by Mr. Natch

were performed by the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen with work being completed as
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requested and Ellsworth Paulsen ultimately being assured by Mr. Hatch on behalf of Broadstone
that the subcontractors would be paid for their work. The change orders took place in this
fashion in both Building I and II. It was not the custom or practice of Ellsworth Paulsen or Mr.
Hatch/Broadstone, to communicate with the architect for approval of the change orders. In fact,
the process for requesting change orders and having them approved involved eliminating the
architect from that procedure both by Ellsworth Paulsen and by Broadstone.
9.

As to the information reflected in Defendants' Exhibit 64 pertaining to Building I,

all of the work requested in Mr. Hatch's change orders on behalf of Broadstone was completed
by Ellsworth Paulsen.
10.

Although the evidence establishes that the parties entered into the agreement for

the development of the project to construct Building I and II using AIA document forms, this
Court finds that the custom and practice between Ellsworth Paulsen and Broadstone resulted in a
deviation from the requirement for change orders as contained in the AIA documents. As the
general custom and practice, and as a result of the relationship between Ellsworth Paulsen and
Mr. Hatch/Broadstone, all of the change orders were not written and signed off on prior to the
time work began. The change orders were done at the request of Mr. Hatch without consultation
by him with the architect, and as established in many instances, without consulting with
Ellsworth Paulsen Instead, Mr. Hatch directly communicated and instructed the subcontractors
to make changes
11.

By reason of the agreed upon procedure and process for processing change orders,

Broadstone waived any claim that all the change orders must be signed and the court finds that
all work requested by Mr. Hatch/Broadstone of the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen was
completed.
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12.

The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen cannot collect from 51-SPR the $78,000 it

paid Mr. Hatch/Broadstone. Mr. Hatch's activity and participation with respect to the Williams
property did not relate to his agreements with Mr. Chimento and 51-SPR for the development of
the Auto Mall/North Shore project, nor was the Williams property part of the development of the
two North Shore buildings.
B.

Mr. Wilson
13.

The evidence establishes that Mark Wilson was the architect on the project and Mr.

Hatch asked him to design Northshore Buildings 1 and II. Mr. Wilson contracted with
Broadstone and Mr. Hatch for work he did on the project. The evidence does not indicate that
Mr. Wilson ever dealt with 51-SPR as to any work he performed on the project.
14.

The evidence establishes that on occasion, Mr. Hatch would meet with Mr. Wilson

and discuss the status of the project. But Mr. Hatch, on behalf of Broadstone, left Mr. Wilson
out of the loop in requesting and approving change orders. Mr. Hatch himself contacted the
subcontractors directly without prior consultation with Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson was eventually
informed by Mr. Hatch of the change orders that were requested and work that was performed on
both Buildings of the Northshore project.
15.

Mr. Wilson, based upon his meetings with Mr. Hatch believed that all of the work

required by Mr. Hatch from Ellsworth Paulsen was performed according to the change order
request. On rare occasion, the evidence establishes that Ellsworth Paulsen brought cha^e
orders to Mr. Wilson for his approval and signature.
C.

Mr. Chimento
16.

Mr. Chimento is a real estate developer residing in California. 51-SPR is an entity

established by Mr. Chimento. Mr. Chimento and his brother met Mr. Hatch in approximately
7

1999 and over a period of time discussed with him the development of what Mr. Chimento
referred to as the Auto Mall property in American Fork. The testimony of Mr. Chimento
establishes that as of approximately August 2001, as a result of discussions between Mr.
Chimento on behalf of 51-SPR and Mr. Hatch, on behalf of Broadstone, that Mr. Hatch
voluntarily surrendered all of his interest in the project involving Buildings 1 and II. The
evidence establishes that at all times during the development and construction of Buildings 1 and
II, Mr. Hatch had the authority for an acted on behalf of Mr. Chimento and 51-SPR.
17.

The evidence establishes that Ellsworth Paulsen had no reason to submit the

change orders for approval by 51-SPR because Ellsworth Paulsen was unaware of 51-SPR's
interest in the project.
18.

Shortly before the completion of the project, Mr. Ellsworth became aware of Mr.

Chimento and communication ensued between Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Chimento. Mr. Ellsworth
advised Mr.' Chimento that Ellsworth Paulsen had not been paid for its work on the project and
Mr. Chimento assured Mr. Ellsworth that he would look into the matter and determine what
needed to be done to assure payment to Ellsworth Paulsen and complete construction on the
project.
D.

Notice of Interest
19.

The evidence establishes that the Notice of Interest, Defendants' Exhibit 22, was

prepared and filed by Ellsworth-Paulsen on or about April 2, 2001. The Notice of Interest was
filed because Broadstone was delinquent in its payments to Ellsworth Paui^en. Subsequent to
the filing of the Notice of Interest and after discussing the same with counsel, Ellsworth Paulsen
released the Notice of Interest on or about February 28, 2002 as per Plaintiffs Exhibit 26
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATED
TO THE PARTIES' CLAIMS
L

Breach of Contract
20.

This Court has previously determined that, as Broadstone's partner and joint-

venturer, 51-SPR is liable to Ellsworth Paulsen for Broadstone's contract debts. The evidence
establishes that 51-SPR failed and refused to pay the June, July, and August 2002 draw requests,
thereby breaching its contract with Ellsworth Paulsen. The court further finds that Ellsworth
Paulsen completed all of the required work, and there is no evidence to establish that any of the
work is defective or otherwise has problems.
21.

Therefore, this Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to the amounts set

forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 27 less the $78,000 Williams property request.
II.

Abusive Lien
22.

51-SPR has made a claim pursuant to U.C.A. §38-1-25 for abuse of hen right in

which it has characterized as a malicious lien claim. This claim pertains to activity associated
with the Williams property and the recordation of a lien by Ellsworth Paulsen in the amount of
$78,000. In determining whether 51-SPR is entitled to relief under 38-1-25, the Court adopts the
findings previously recited herein with respect to the Williams property and the $78,000 paid by
Ellsworth Paulsen to Mr. Hatch and Broadstone.
23.

Section 38-1-3 of the Utah Code provides the following:
Contactors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration or
improvemei t of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any
manner. . . shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or
equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively . . .

This Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen believed it was entitled to lien, because the lien was
9

put in place at the instruction of Mr. Hatch in order to ensure reimbursement to Ellsworth
Paulsen for the $78,000. At the time the $78,000 was paid, and at the time the lien was filed,
Ellsworth Paulsen did not know how much of the $78,000 was used or applied to the
construction of Buildings I and II. Ellsworth Paulsen acted in good faith and upon the
instructions of the owner of the property when placing its lien.
24.

Section 38-1-25 of the Utah Code describes the penalties to be imposed upon

those parties who commit an abuse of lien right. This Section states:
(1) Any person entitled to record or file a lien under Section 38-1-3 is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor who intentionally causes a claim of lien against any
property, which contains a greater demand than the sum due to be recorded or
filed:
(a) with the intent to cloud the title;
(b) to exact from the owner or person liable by means of the excessive
claim of lien more than is due: or
(c) to procure any unjustified advantage or benefit.
(2) In addition to any criminal penalties under Subsection (1), a person who
violates Subsection (1) is liable to the owner of the property or an original
contractor or subcontractor who is affected by the lien for the greater of:
(a) twice the amount by which the wrongful lien exceeds the amount
actually due; or
(b) the actual damages incurred by the owner of the property.
The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen did file a lien against the property in question,
however, Ellsworth Paulsen did not intend to cloud the title to exact more than it believed was
due or procure an unjustified advantage.
25.

The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen acted in good faith in claiming the $78,000

based upon the instruction and direction given by Mr. Natch and Broadstone. The Court finds
that Ellsworth Paulsen's only intent in filing the lien was to ensure payment of the $78,000 it had
given to Vintage Construction at the direction of Mr Hatch, the owner of the property The
recording of the hen was done solely at the direction of Mr. Hatch to ensure that Ellsworth
Paulsen would be reimbursed for the $78,000 it paid. At the time the $78,000 was paid, and at
10

the time the lien was filed, Ellsworth Paulsen as a result of its conversations with Mr. Hatch, did
not know how much of the $78,000 was used or would be applied to the construction of
Buildings I and 11. This Court finds that the lien was not intended to extract from the owner
more than was due or procure an unjustified advantage, because the lien was filed for the amount
to be reimbursed to Ellsworth Paulsen.
26.

Ellsworth Paulsen did not cause the lien to be filed with the intent to cloud the

property to exact more than it believed was due or procure an unjustified advantage, thus this
Court finds no violation of U.C.A §38-1-25(1). Since the Court does not find a violation of
Subsection (1), the penalties in Subsection (2) do not apply. However, Ellsworth Paulsen is not
entitled to judgment against 51-SPR for such amount.
III.

Wrongful Lien
27.

As to the wrongful lien claim, the evidence establishes that Mr. Ellsworth filed the

Notice of Interest because Mr. Hatch/Broadstone were delinquent on the payments due Ellsworth
Paulsen, and someone in his office told him it was a good idea. The Notice remained a matter of
public record from the time of filing, on April 2, 2001, until it was removed on February 28,
2002, immediately following Mr. Ellsworth's consultation with counsel. The Court finds that
the Notice of Interest was not authorized by the owner of the real property, Mr. Hatch, and was
not a proper document to have been filed by Ellsworth Paulsen.
28.

In order for 51-SPR to claim civil liability for the filing of a wrongful lien against

Ellsworth Paulsen, 51-SPR must qualify under U.C.A. §38-9-1, as either the record interest
holder or record owner of the property in question. According to U.C.A. §38-9-1(6):
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is
recorded or filed is not:
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute:
11

(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction in the state; or
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of
the real property.
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1(6) (emphasis added).
29.

The Court finds that there is no evidence of a recorded interest by 51-SPR during

the time in question. Based on the evidence produced, the Court finds that there was a real estate
purchase agreement between Broadstone and 51-SPR pertaining to the property in question dated
June 15, 2000 (See Defendants' Exhibit 56), but there is no evidence of recordation of ownership
interest in 51-SPR during the time in question. The evidence only establishes an unrecorded real
estate agreement without any notice to Ellsworth Paulsen of 51-SPR's interest in the North
Shore project.
30.

The record owner at the time of recording of the wrongful lien was

Hatch/Broadstone. 51-SPR was not the record owner at the time the Notice of Interest was filed.
The Notice of Interest was filed and recorded in Apnl 2, 2001. The release was filed on
February 28, 2002. There has been no evidence presented for the Court to find that 51-SPR was
the record owner as defined by U.C.A. §38-9-1 at the time of the recording of the document, nor
has there has been any evidence to establish that a wrongful lien had any negative impact on 51SPR's subsequent ownership of the property.
31.

Section 38-9-4 of the Utah Code sets forth the damages and civil liability for filing

a wrongful lien. The language of the statute provides that:
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for treble
actual damages, whichevei is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs,
who records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in
Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property,
knowing or having reason to know that the document:
(a) is a wrongful lien;
(b) is groundless; or
12

(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim.
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3).
The Court finds that the Notice of Interest was an improper document to have been filed by
Ellsworth Paulsen.
32.

Furthermore, no request was made by Hatch or Broadstone to remove the Notice

and, under the applicable statute, Ellsworth Paulsen would be liable to the record owner at the
time of the recording of the document. 51-SPR did provide notice to Ellsworth Paulsen by a
letter from Mr. Chimento dated November 29, 2001 to remove the Notice of Interest (See
Defendants' Exhibit 51), and the claim was subsequently removed on February 23, 2002.
33.

There has been no evidence to establish that as of the date of Mr. Chimento's letter

to Ellsworth Paulsen, that 51-SPR was a "record interest holder" of the real property. The only
evidence of ownership to the real property presented at the time of trial consisted of the deed of
trust and promissory notes to Buildings I and 11 establishing Broadstone as the owner without
any reference to 51-SPR.
34.

The Notice was released at the direction of Ellsworth Paulsen's counsel and no

actual damages were proved. Also, no evidence of attorney's fees were proved by 51-SPR in
connection with the removal of the wrongful lien. This Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is
liable to 51-SPR in the amount of $3,000. Any claim for attorney's fees under U.C.A. §38-9-4 is
denied.
IV.

Retention and Retention Interest
35.

As to the issue of retentions, the evidence produced by Ellsworth Paulsen

establishes that the claimed retentions for Building 1 were in the amount of $92,939.39. The
claimed retentions for Building 11 were in the amount of $47,142.77.
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36.

The Court finds that the custom and practice of Ellsworth Paulsen was to subnut

requested draws to Central Bank or Broadstone, Central Bank was to make payments based on
these draws. The retentions represent amounts not actually paid by Central Bank. Ellsworth
Paulsen's position is that it is entitled to interest on those amounts as retained amounts by
Central Bank and/or Broadstone. The evidence establishes that such monies were never
physically accounted for and retained and identified as such by Central Bank or Broadstone. The
amounts claimed as retained monies do not exist.
37.

As to the calculation of retention interest amounts, the evidence does not support a

finding that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to its claim for retention interest against 51-SPR. The
monies claimed by Ellsworth Paulsen for retention were never withheld, never identified as
retained funds by Central Bank or 51-SPR.
38.

Furthermore, Ellsworth Paulsen's claim against 51-SPR for retention interest is

denied. U.C.A. §13-8-5(10)(b)(i) requires that Ellsworth Paulsen prove Broadstone and or 51SPR knowingly and wrongfully withheld a retention in order to recover. U.C.A. §13-8-5(l)(b)
states:
(b)(i) Any owner, public agency, original contractor, or subsequent who
knowingly and wrongfully withholds a retention shall be subject to a charge of
2% per month on the improperly withheld amount, in addition to any interest
otherwise due.
The Court finds that Broadstone and 51-SPR did not withhold retention proceeds, nor did
they attempt to do so knowingly or wrongfully. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen failed to
present sufficient evidence to support a finding that §13-8-5 requires 51-SPR to be responsible
for the payment of such monies.
V.

Pre-judgement Interest
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39.

With regard to Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for pre-judgment interest, the Court finds

that Ellsworth Paulsen cannot recovery its claim for pre-judgment interest against 51-SPR. It is
undisputed that Ellsworth Paulsen never submitted to anyone its final payment application on
Building I or the final two applications on Building II. These three applications remain
unsigned. It is not possible for the Court to set a specific date on which payment of the three unsubmitted applications became due. The court has considered the information submitted by the
parties subsequent to the time of trial with respect to calculation of pre-judgment interest and the
court cannot, as Ellsworth Paulsen suggests, simply "pick a date" from which interest begins to
accrue.
40.

The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen has not been successful in marshaling

evidence or law to support a claim for pre-judgment interest and the court is unable to fix a date
as to the time for calculation of that interest. Based on the evidence presented at the time of trial,
it is clear that a date cannot be sufficiently calculated. Ellsworth Paulsen cannot recover its
claim for pre-judgment interest on its three un-submitted payment applications.
41.

However, the Court does find that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to pre-judgment

contractual interest on its breach of contract claim as requested, but denies Ellsworth Paulsen's
claim for interest on its mechanic's lien foreclosure claim.
VI.

Attorney's Fees
42.

Attorney's fees are generally awarded to the prevailing party. U.C.A §38-1-18(1)

explains that a Court is allowed to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party:
(1) Except as provided in Section 18-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be
entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, which
shall be taxed as costs in the action.
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18(1) (emphasis added).
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43.

By reason of the claims made by 51-SPR, this Court must make a determination as

to which of the parties is the prevailing party entitled to make a claim for attorney's fees. Under
Pochynok v. Smedsrud, et. al., 2003 UT App 375, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that the
trial court was in a better position to determine which party was the prevailing party.
Considering all of the factors and formulas discussed in Pochynok, the Court finds from all the
evidence presented, that Ellsworth Paulsen is the prevailing party in the case and is entitled to
attorney's fees and costs. The factors the Court relies on to support its findings that Ellsworth
Paulsen is the prevailing party are as follows:
A.

Ellsworth Paulsen's breach of contract claim is granted.

B.

The work was performed by Ellsworth Paulsen and the subcontractors on
North Shore Buildings 1 and II at the direction of the owner, Mr. Hatch
and Broadstone, both under the terms of the contract and through change
orders, with full compliance by Ellsworth Paulsen in performing all of the
work requested by the owner.

C.

Judge Schofield previously found that 51-SPR, by reason of a joint
venture with Broadstone and Mr. Hatch, stood in the same position as
Broadstone.

D.

The Court has reviewed all of the evidence produced with respect to the
amounts claimed regarding the mechanic's lien claim and has evaluated
those amounts at issue and determined that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to
its claim on the mechanic's lien claim for amounts less the $78,000
associated with the Williams property.

44.

Considering the totality of all the evidence, even though a portion of the claimed

amount was denied to Ellsworth Paulsen, the facts support a finding that Ellsworth Paulsen is the
16

prevailing party. Furthermore, in this case, the facts distinguish the application of the Pochynok
case; in Pochynok, there was an offer of judgment submitted which the Court of Appeals relied
upon to reach its determination as to which party ultimately prevailed in the lawsuit. Here, there
was never an offer of judgment by 51-SPR or Broadstone.
VL Reasonableness of Attorney Fees
45.

After the Court determined that Ellsworth Paulsen was the prevailing party, and as

such was entitled reasonable to attorneys fees, Ellsworth Paulsen's counsel submitted an
affidavit setting forth what it suggests are the reasonable attorney fees in this case. As required
by the case of A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518
(Utah App. 1999), Ellsworth Paulsen has allocated in its affidavit those attorney fees which are
recoverable under the lien statute, from those fees which were incurred pursuing legal claims and
theories for which it would not be entitled to a fee award. As set forth in the affidavit of counsel,
Ellsworth Paulsen, is claiming that it is entitled to $164,993.60 for fees which are related directly
or indirectly to its mechanic's lien claim. The Court has reviewed the affidavit using the factors
set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Brakes 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988). These factors are: 1)
Was the legal work actually performed ? 2) How much of the work was reasonably necessary to
prosecute and defend the matter? 3) Was the attorney's billing rate reasonable in light of the
locality and type of services rendered? 4) Are there other factors requiring special
consideration?
46.

As to the first factor, the court finds that the attorney fees presented by Ellsworth

Paulsen represent fees for work actually performed. The fees requested are not disproportionate
to the amounts claimed or recovered. This is particularly so considering the amounts which were
originally claimed by Ellsworth Paulsen, before several of the subcontractors were eliminated
from the case through settlement. The court has reviewed the entries for the work claimed, and
17

recognizes that most of such work related to work being presented in one form or another in
open court. In this case, many of the issues presented in the form of motions and trial work
evidence were inextricably tied to the mechanic's lien claims. This includes the entries for such
issues as the lien waivers, the timeliness of the liens, the writ of attachment, the legal work
related to the alternate security, and like matters. The court finds also that the amounts claimed
by Ellsworth Paulsen as allocated to the claims for which it can recover is reasonable in the
amount of $164,993.60, and that the work reflected for those fees was actually performed.
47.

As to the second issue of what legal work was reasonablely necessary to prosecute

the case, the evidence supports the reasonableness of the fees as to this factor. This action was
complex from the beginning, with at least twelve different parties involved. The record shows
that there were approximately 21 depositions taken, and approximately 90 motions filed. 51SPR asserted numerous counter-claims, which could have defeated recovery under the lien, but
which were defeated by Ellsworth Paulsen, primarily through motions. 51-SPR has filed an
affidavit in support of its default judgment against Broadstone and Hatch claiming fees in this
case, and a much smaller related case, of $427,249. As such, the evidence supports Ellsworth
Paulsen's contention that $164,993.60 is an appropriate and reasonable fee under the
circumstances.
48.

The Court also finds that the hourly rates charged by Mr. Poulsen and Mr. Reich,

the attorney fees for Ellswori, Paulsen, are billing rates which are customarily charged by
attorney's of their experience. Mr. Poulsen's rate through all but the last two months of this case
was $170 per hour, and Mr. Reich's rate was $140 per hour. These rates are customary and usual
for this type of legal work in Utah and Salt Lake Counties.
49.

Finally, as to any special factors which support the award of fees in this case, the

court reiterates those points referred to above when it found that Ellsworth Paulsen was the
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prevailing party in this case. Those factors included the fact that 51-SPR breached the contract
by failing to pay contract balances, and that all of the work, including the extra work, was
properly and timely performed and contained no defects. Accordingly, as Broadstone's joint
venture partner, the work should have been paid for by 51-SPR.
VII. COSTS.
50.

Ellsworth Paulsen has submitted a verified memorandum of costs in which it seeks

reimbursement for its costs in the amount of $7,467.73. The claimed costs consist of expenses
for filing the action, services of process, witness fees, deposition transcripts, and certain limited
duplication and blow-up charges for trial exhibits. The court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is only
entitled to get the costs of depositions on those persons who actually testified at trial. Ellsworth
Paulsen has claimed costs for two deponants who did not testify at trial. Those persons were
Kyle Spencer whose deposition costs were $162, and Angela Solberg who deposition costs were
$477.60 These sums are reduced out of Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for costs, leaving net costs
allowed to Ellsworth Paulsen for costs of $6,828.13.
ORDER
Based upon the forgoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to a judgment in this matter on its breach of contract

claims and mechanic's lien claims in the principle amount of $199,830.53 on Northshore
Building I.

Ellsworth Paulsen is also awarded judgment for $364,991.26 on Northshore

Building II, minus $78,000 for the change ordei representing amounts paid for work on the
Williams property, and $3,000 for filing the Notice of Interest. This leaves a net judgment of
$483,821.79 ($364,991.26 + $199,830.53 - $564,821.79 minus $78,000 and minus $3,000 -Net
Judgment $483,821.79).
19

2.

Ellsworth Paulsen is further entitled to contractual interest of $57,863.94 in

accordance with the attached Schedule "A. This interest rate should be augmented by the
interest which has accrued smce December 22, 2003, (the day that Schedule "A" was prepared)
through the date of this order, which sum is $7,768.47, for a total pre-judgment amount of
$65,632.41.
3.

Ellsworth Paulsen is also entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party in this

case. The reasonable attorneys fees awarded to Ellsworth Paulsen is $164,933.60 through
February 17,h, 2004, to be taxed as costs as required by Utah Code. Ann. §38-18-1(1).
4.

Finally, Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to $6,828.13 to be taxed as costs.

In summary, Ellsworth Paulsen is awarded a judgment in the total amount, including
principle, interest, attorney fees and costs of $721,215.93 Based upon the 10% per annum
interest rate set forth in the parties' contract, this judgment shall continue to bear interest postjudgment at 10% per annum, and any judgment rendered herein may be augmented by Ellsworth
Paulsen's reasonable attorney fees through collection. The total judgment rendered in this case
may be enforced against the Alternate Security Bond on file with the Court in which Capitol
Indemnity Corporation is the surety.
Dated this

/<f day of AeriX^004.

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Judge (jary £M Stott
APPROVED AS TO FORM-

R. Stephen Marshall
Erik Olsen
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SUMMARY OF INTEREST DUE ON ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS
Pav Request #
Date
3/6/2001
3/6/2001
3/6/2001
3/6/2001
3/6/2001
3/6/2001
3/6/2001
3/6/2001
3/6/2001
3/6/2001
3/6/2001
3/6/2001
4/16/2001
none

Due Date
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
5/16/2001
none

Date Paid
4/16/2001
5/7/2001
6/27/2001
7/5/2001
7/18/2001
7/26/2001
7/31/2001
8/10/2001
12/31/2002
10/14/2003
12/10/2003
not paid
not paid
not paid

Invoice Amount
47,429.87
$
27,938.67
$
8,000.00
$
26,974.91
$
10,343.70
$
34,260.58
$
3,961.18
$
11,139.70
$
800.80
$
2,089.02
$
16,133.59
$
36,457.43
$
87,138.17
$
76,234.93
$

Building II
12/15/2000
2
1/11/2001
3
5/31/2001
7
5/31/2001
7
7/17/2001
8
7/17/2001
8
7/17/2001
8
7/17/2001
8
7/17/2001
8
none
9
none
10

1/14/2001
2/10/2001
6/30/2001
6/30/200'
8/16/2001
8/1^/2001
8/16/2001
8/15/2001
8/16/2001
none
none

2/2/2001
2/21/2001
7/31/2001
10/15/2003
12/31/2002
10/15/2003
10/15/2003
12/10/2003
not paid
not paid
not paid

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Building 1
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
8
9

345,284.19
260,050.42
7,342.50
1,710.86
10,601.00
119,425.00
32,978.00
59,599.41
83,146.18
197,079.64
78,465.15

Days Late
11
32
83
91
104
112
117
127
635
922
979
991
950
0

interest Rate
10.0%
10,0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
TOTAL

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Interest Due
142.94
244.94
181.92
672.53
294.72
1,051.28
126.97
387 60
9,898.44
22,679.80
35,681.15

19
11
31
837
502
790
790
846
858
0
0

10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10 0%
10 0%
10 0%
10 0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
TOTAL

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

1,797.37
783.71
62.36
19,539 35
22,182.79

$

57,863.94

GR AND TOTAL FOR BOTH BUILDINGS

Hansen seitlement
Westwood settlement
Halverson settlement

never submitted

Allstate settlement
Hansen settlement
Allstate settlement
Westwood settlement
Halversnn settlement
never submitted
never submitted

ffc

TabE
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CARTER WINDES, individually and
d/b/a MID-AMERICA HYPERBARICS, INC.,
and/or MID-AMERICA HYPERBARICS, LLP,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 04-CV-854-JHP-FHM

v.
RICHMOND HYPERBARIC MEDICINE, INC.,
an Arkansas corporation; JOHN A. RICHMOND,
JR., and OCEAN BREEZE HYBERBARIC,
INC.,
Defendants.
ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Response
thereto, and Defendants' Reply, as well as Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Defendants' Response thereto, and Plaintiffs' Reply.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, Defendant Richmond moves the Court for summary
judgment in his favor on all causes of action remaining in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, to
wit: breach of joint venture, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of contract, quantum meruit,
and unjust enrichment. Defendants Richmond Hyperbaric and Ocean Breeze join Richmond's
motion as to the causes of action for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, the only claims
asserted against them. Conversely, Plaintiff moves the Court for summary judgment on the
following issues:
(1)

that Plaintiff Windes and Defendant Richmond were engaged in a joint venture

E
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for purposes of obtaining a hyperbaric service contract with Tulsa Regional
Medical Center (TRMC);
that Richmond owed Windes fiduciary duties as a result of this joint venture;
that Richmond wrongfully dissociated from the venture and usurped the TRMC
contract;
that the profits Defendants reaped from the TRMC contract are held in trust for
the joint venturers, i.e., Windes and Richmond.

In the interests of accuracy and efficiency, the Court treats these pleadings as crossmotions. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND
From the undisputed facts in this case, the Court finds the following:
Around October 2002, Plaintiff Carter Windes approached Defendant John Richmond
about pursuing a contract to provide hyperbaric services at TRMC. Together with Lori Ormsby
of TRMC, the parties believed that this operation would be viable. Windes and Richmond
decided to split their profits equally, with Richmond contributing consulting services based on
his experience as a certified hyperbaric technician, and Windes taking responsibility for
financing and negotiations. These terms were not reduced to writing. Both parties attended
meetings with TRMC, and TRMC believed that they were working together on the project. The
parties were working toward a final contract by February 2003.
At some point during the contract negotiation process, Lori Ormsby of TRMC changed
the contract drafted on behalf of Windes to show the name of the contractor to be "Ocean
Breeze." Ocean Breeze was an entity created by Richmond and incorporated on or around
February 23, 2003. Windes was not a part of Ocean Breeze. In late February 2003, Lori
2
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Ormsby of TRMC notified Windes that TRMC would not pursue the contract with him any
longer. Some time after Ormsby told Windes that their deal was off, Richmond informed
Windes that their relationship was also "finished." TRMC and Ocean Breeze executed a
contract for Ocean Breeze to provide hyperbaric services to TRMC on March 7, 2003. The
relationship between Ocean Breeze and TRMC lasted until June 1, 2005.
Plaintiff now alleges that Defendant usurped the contract opportunity with TRMC and is
liable to Plaintiff therefor. The case is now before the Court on cross-motions for summary
judgment.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is significantly probative or more
than merely colorable such that a jury could reasonably return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" if proof thereof
might affect the outcome of the lawsuit as assessed from the controlling substantive law. Id. at
249. The presence of a genuine issue of material fact defeats the motion.
In making the summary judgment determination, the Court examines the factual record
and draws reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Simms v. Oklahoma, 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court also interprets the rule in
such a way as to isolate and dispose of factually unsupportable claims or defenses. See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment is also appropriate if any

3
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element of the prima facie case lacks sufficient evidence to require submission to a jury.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248-49.
The cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Carter Windes and Defendant
John A. Richmond are now before the Court.
L Windes and Richmond were engaged in a joint venture.
A joint venture is an association of two or more people to carry out a single business
enterprise for profit. Martin v. Chapel Wilkinson. Riggs & Abney. 637 P.2d 81, 85 (Okla.
1981). A joint venture is characterized by (1) joint interest in the project, (2) an express or
implied agreement to share profits and losses, and (3) cooperative conduct to achieve the
common purpose. Id; see also Crest Constr. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.. 417 F. Supp. 564, 56869 (W.D. Okla. 1976). Plaintiff here asserts that the parties were engaged in a joint venture.
Defendant denies that a joint venture was formed on the grounds that the parties did not acquire
a joint interest in the project, nor did they agree to share losses [Def. Resp. at 5], although
Defendant concedes that the parties agreed to share profits and engaged in cooperative conduct
[Def.Mtn.atl4].
A. Joint Interest
A joint interest in the project is demonstrated when the parties are "engaged in an
enterprise in which they have a community of interest and a common purpose in its
performance." Crest Constr. Co., 417 F. Supp. at 569. In order to demonstrate a joint interest,
the parties must combine "their property, capital, materials, money, efforts, skill, services, or
knowledge in the undertaking." 48 C.J.S. Joint Adventures § 12 (cmt.). The parties'
contributions need not be equal in character or proportion "so long as each joint venturer

4
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contributes something to the motive of the enterprise." Id; see also Martin, 637 P.2d at 85 (each
party must contribute "something promotive of the enterprise").
Here, the undisputed facts show that Windes and Richmond orally agreed to pursue a
contract to provide hyperbaric services to Tulsa Regional Medical Center (TRMC). [Def. Mtn. at
4, U 15; Pltf. Mtn. at 3,ffi[1-4.] They each assumed duties toward the furtherance of the venture.
Windes established initial contact with TRMC. [Def Mtn. at 4, f 12; Pltf. Mtn. at 3, % 2.]
Windes was also supposed to secure financing [Def. Mtn. at 5, K 18; Pltf. Mtn. at 4, % 5] and
continue negotiations with TRMC [Def. Mtn. at 5, lfl[ 18, 22; Pltf. Mtn. at 4, 5,ffl[6, 12].
Richmond was supposed to provide expertise on hyperbaric services, a crucial contribution to the
venture, as Windes had no experience in this area. [Def. Mtn. at 4,ffi[14-15; Pltf. Mtn. at 4,ffi[5,
8.] Both parties had contact with TRMC's contracting official [Def. Mtn. at 5, 9, 10,fflj20, 43,
45; Pltf. Mtn. at 3, 4,ffi[3, 9], who believed that Windes and Richmond were working together
[Def. Mtn. at 5, \ 20; Pltf. Mtn. at 4, U 10]. Windes and Richmond undertook all of these
activities with the agreement that they would share profits equally [Def. Mtn. at 4, ^| 4; Pltf. Mtn.
at 3, H 4], which further implies a joint interest in the project. See Ballard v. United States. 17
F.3d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1994). These actions also demonstrate the parties' cooperative conduct in
furtherance of the purpose of the joint venture.
B. Profit and Loss Sharing
An agreement to share prufits and losses may be express or implied. Martin, 637 P.2d at
85. Here, the parties expressly agreed .o split their profits equally. [Def. Mtn. at 4, U 4; Pltf.
Mtn. at 3, ^ 4.] While the parties did not have an express agreement as to losses, such agreement
may be inferred. Because Richmond agreed to provide consulting services "solely in return for a

5
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share of expected profits, it could be seen that he stood to share in the losses of the enterprise as
well as its profits." See Crest Constr. Co., 417 F. Supp. at 468; compare Def Mtn. at 10, ^ 49
(stating that "Richmond was to receive 50% of the profits and was to have no personal financial
liability whatsoever for the purchase of the chambers) (emphasis added), with Pltf. Mtn. at 4, ^
7 (noting that "Richmond's compensation was based on profits" and if the project was not
profitable, "he would lose his time, travel, and efforts he put into the venture").
Based on its review of the undisputed facts in this case, as well as the applicable law, this
Court finds that Windes and Richmond did establish a joint venture for the particular purpose of
obtaining a hyperbaric service contract with TRMC. Proposition One of Plaintiff s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED. For the same reasons, Argument One of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, which is primarily predicated upon the proposition
that no joint venture existed between these parties, is DENIED. Because the Court finds that the
agreement between these parties is properly characterized as a joint venture, the Court agrees
with Defendant that Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is "simply a weaker version of the first
cause of action for breach of joint venture agreement." [Def. Mtn. at 20.] The oral contract
alleged by Plaintiff that supposedly obligated Richmond to pay Windes a percentage of the profit
[see Am. Compl. U 47] is actually part of the oral joint venture agreement between the parties,
rather than a separate contract. The Court therefore GRANTS Argument Three of Defendant's
Motion for Nummary Judgment, and thereby disposes of Plaintiff s breach of contract claim.
II. The relationship between joint venturers is fiduciary in nature.
It is axiomatic that the relationship between joint venturers is fiduciary in nature and
requires the utmost good faith in all dealings of the parties with each other. Rockett v. Ford, 326

6

Case 4:04~cv-00854-JHP-FHM

Document 63

Filed in USDC ND/OK on 12/20/2005

Page 7 of 13

P.2d 787, 791 (Okla. 1958); Dike v. Martin. 204 P. 1106, 1109 (Okla. 1922). As a matter of law,
"a joint adventurer .. . owes a fiduciary duty to the other partners not to open a competing
[enterprise] and not to divert assets of the joint venture to that competing [enterprise]." Hallock
v. Holiday Isle Resort & Marina. 885 So. 2d 459, 462 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004). This duty not to
compete, as well as other fiduciary duties, derives from state partnership law. Crest Constr. Co..
417 F. Supp. at 568. Indeed, the law of partnership applies equally to joint ventures. See The
Oklahoma Co. v. O'Neil. 440 P.2d 978, 984 (Okla. 1968)(citing O.K. Boiler & Welding Co. v.
Minnetonka Lumber Co.. 229 P. 1045, 1048 (Okla. 1924)("After the parties have created and
engaged in a joint enterprise, although it may relate to a single transaction, the law of partnership
applies to the questions arising between and among the parties, and in relation to third
parties.")). In Oklahoma, under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 54 Okla. Stat. § 1-101 et
seq., joint venturers owe each other the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. Id § 1-404(a).
Joint venturers' duty of loyalty to each other specifically includes "to refrain from competing
with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership business before the dissolution of the
partnership," among other duties. Id § 1-404(b)(3). Further, a joint venturer must "account to
the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit. . . derived from . . . the
appropriation of a partnership opportunity." Id § 1-404(b)(1). These obligations are directly at
issue in this case.
Because the Court finds that Windes and Richmond were engaged in a joint venture, the
Court also finds as a matter of law that these parties owed a fiduciary duty to each other.
Proposition Two of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED.

7
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III. Richmond breached his duty of loyalty to Windes.
A party to a joint venture may always withdraw by giving notice to his partners. 54
Okla. Stat. § 1-601(1). Here, Defendant did give notice of his express will to withdraw. [Def.
Mtn. at 17.] However, Plaintiff asserts that Richmond's withdrawal was untimely and otherwise
inappropriate so as to constitute a breach of the joint venture agreement. [Pltf. Mtn. at 13.]
Further, Plaintiff argues that even if Richmond properly terminated the venture, Richmond was
still not entitled to pursue the venture project independently, due to his ongoing duty not to
compete. [Pltf. Mtn. at 14-15.]
In response to Plaintiffs claims of breach, Defendant alleges that the venture had already
failed. [Def. Mtn. at 14-16.] In certain cases, a joint venture may fail because conditions
necessary to its success cannot be met. See Knight v. Cecil 235 P. 1107, 1111 (Okla. 1925). In
such instances,
[i]f any party to the joint venture had refused to substantially perform his
obligation, his associates might terminate their relation with him and carry out the
enterprise to his exclusion, and if for this or any other valid reason they chose to
terminate the relationship, they could do so only by giving notice to him that the
relationship was then and there ended.
Id. at 1112. Under the analogous Oklahoma partnership law, a party to a joint venture may seek
termination of the venture via judicial determination if his partner "engaged in conduct relating
to the partnership business which makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in
partnership with the partner

" 54 Okla. Stat. § l-601(5)(iii).

Here, Defendant alleges that Windes "dropped the ball" so that TRMC refused to do
business with Windes, and the venture itself therefore became "impracticable." [Def. Mtn. at 1416.] In the alternative, Richmond asserts that he properly withdrew from the venture and

8
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pursued the TRMC contract independently because Windes failed to perform. [Def Mtn. at 17.]
However, because Defendant did not seek Windes's expulsion by judicial termination, the joint
venture was not successfully terminated and Richmond's withdrawal was therefore wrongful.
Although the Court recognizes the parties' belief that an ongoing "source of contention
lies in the extent and nature of the fiduciary duty owed " between them, see Hallock, 885 So. 2d
at 464 (Shepherd, J., dissenting in part), the Court does not find any genuine issues of material
fact to support said contention. "[T]he four elements of an actionable breach of fiduciary duty
claim are: (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) a duty arising out of the fiduciary
relationship, (3) a breach of the duty, and (4) damages proximately caused by the breach of
duty." FDIC v. Grant. 8 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1299 (N.D. Okla. 1999). Pursuant to the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act, 54 Okla. Stat. § 1-101 et seq., the Court finds that Richmond breached
the duty of loyalty he owed to Windes by virtue of their joint venture. Although the timing of
the notice Richmond gave to Windes that the joint venture was "finished," relative to other key
events in the history of this venture, such as the timing of and circumstances surrounding the
formation of Ocean Breeze1 is disputed, the fact of the matter is that Richmond's withdrawal
from the venture before the completion of the undertaking was wrongful as a matter of law. See
id. § l-602(b)(2)(I)("A partner's dissociation is wrongful only if. . . in the case of a partnership
for a . . . particular undertaking, before . . . the completion of the undertaking^] . . . the partner

1

Joint ventures differ from partnerships in tha: the parties to a joint venture may engage
in separate business enterprises - even competing ones - during the pursuit of the joint venture
project. See generally Hallock, 885 So. 2d at 463-466 (Shepherd, J., dissenting in part). Thus,
Richmond could have formed Ocean Breeze to pursue hyperbaric service contracts with other
medical facilities without insult or injury to his venture with Windes, which was formed solely
for the purpose of pursuing such a contract with TRMC. It is the fact that Ocean Breeze
ultimately secured a contract with TRMC that raises the specters of breach and fraud in this case.
9
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"). Proposition Three of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment is therefore GRANTED, and Argument Two of Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED.
In the event of wrongful dissociation, the withdrawing partner is liable for any damages
caused by the withdrawal. Id. § 1-602(c). It is well settled that a partner's duty of loyalty
extends well past that partner's withdrawal. See, e.g., Leff v. Gunter. 658 P.2d 740, 744 (Cal.
1983) ("A partner's duty not to compete with his partnership with respect to the partnership
opportunity which is actively being pursued by the partnership survives his withdrawal
therefrom."). It is also well settled that, upon breach of that duty, the breaching partner must
compensate the others. See kL ("A partner may not dissolve a partnership to gain the benefits of
the business himself, unless he fully compensates his copartner for his share of the prospective
business opportunity."); see also id. at 746 ("If a member of a copartnership avails himself of
information obtained by him in the course of the transaction of partnership business which is
within the scope of the firm's business, and thereafter applies it to his own account without the
consent or knowledge of his associates, he is liable to account to the firm for any benefit he may
obtain from the use of such information."). Here, although Defendant is clearly liable, the
amount of any damages owed is still in dispute. Proposition Four of Plaintiff s Motion for
Summary Judgment is therefore DENIED because the profits derived from Richmond's
usurpation of the joint venture's opportunity are unquantified.
IV. Plaintiffs fraud claims are still unresolved.
Whether Plaintiff believes Defendant's breach to be premised on fraud is unclear.
Plaintiff asserts a fraud claim against Defendant, predicated on the idea that Richmond was

10
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supposed to "stay behind the scenes." [Am. Compl. 1fl] 35-42; see also Def. Mtn. at 21.] In order
to prove fraud on this point, Windes must establish that (1) Richmond's promise to "stay behind
the scenes" was a material misrepresentation, (2) it was false, (3) Richmond knew it was false,
(4) Richmond intended Windes to rely on the misrepresentation, (4) Windes acted in reliance
thereon, and (5) Windes suffered injury. OUJI-Civ § 18.1; see also Ragland v. Shattuck Nat'I
Bank. 36 F.3d 983, 990 (10th Cir. 1994) (U[A] fraud claim requires proof of these elements: a
material misrepresentation, knowingly or recklessly made, with intent that it be relied upon, and
actual reliance by another to his detriment, and that plaintiffs had stated a claim of fraud . . . with
sufficient particularity to avoid dismissal of their claims.").
Plaintiff also argues that Richmond committed a fraud of omission by failing to notify
Windes of TRMCs dissatisfaction with the progress of the joint venture and instead making
arrangements to take over the project. [Am. Compl.ffl[35-42; see also Pltf. Resp. at 23-24.] To
prove fraud by non-disclosure, Windes must show that (1) Richmond failed to disclose a past or
present fact which he had a duty to disclose, (2) the fact was material, (3) Richmond failed to
disclose the fact in order to create a false impression in Windes's mind, (4) Richmond intended
Windes to act upon the false impression caused by the non-disclosure, (5) Windes acted in
reliance thereon, and (6) Windes suffered injury. OUJI-Civ § 18.2. "Under Oklahoma law, in
determining whether there is a duty to speak, consideration must be given to the situation of the
parties and matters with which they are dealing." Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco Inc., 144 F.3d 1308,
1324 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys.. Inc. v. Brown Flight Rental One Corp..
24 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 1994)). For example, an "absolute positive duty to speak" may
arise from a fiduciary duty or from a partial disclosure. LI
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Defendant moves for summary judgment of Plaintiff s fraud claims on the grounds that
Windes did not change his behavior or rely to his detriment on the alleged fraudulent
misrepresentation or non-disclosure. The Court finds this argument to be more artful than
dispositive. From the facts on hand, a jury could find reliance. Moreover, if fraud does lie in
this case, Plaintiff could be entitled to punitive damages, which would necessitate additional
findings beyond the scope of the motions at issue here. See Roberts Ranch Co. v. Exxon Corp.,
43 F. Supp. 2d 1242,1276 (W.D. Okla. 1997) ("Under Oklahoma law punitive damages are
available for a breach of fiduciary duty where the gravamen of the claim sounds in tort.").
Argument Four of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore DENIED.

V. Plaintiff is not entitled to equitable remedies.
Plaintiff asserted claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment against all
Defendants. Defendants moved for summary judgment of Plaintiff s equitable claims on the
grounds that Windes did not contribute to the joint venture and thus, does not deserve
compensation in quantum meruit, and that any profits realized by Richmond and/or Ocean
Breeze are attributable solely to their own efforts. The Court finds that the issue of Windes's
contribution to the joint venture may be subject to different interpretations under the facts
presented such that summary judgment is inappropriate on that point.
However, the Court notes that neither party addressed the issue of equitable jurisdiction,
which requires that legal remedies be insufficient to redress the plaintiffs injuries before a
plaintiff is entitled to recover in equity. See, e.g., Switzer v. Coan, 261 F.3d 985, 991 (10th Cir.
2001) (noting that equitable relief is generally only available in the absence of adequate remedies
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at law). The Court finds that legal remedies would be appropriate in this case, particularly given
the characterization of the relationship between the parties as a joint venture, for which the
analogous laws of partnership provide a specific remedy. Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to
equitable remedies, and Argument Five of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
accordingly GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part. Because the Court's disposition of certain matters on summary
judgment limits the remaining issues rather significantly, the parties are instructed to file a
Second Supplemental Proposed Pretrial Order by January 17, 2006, with a Pretrial Conference to
follow on January 24, 2006 at 9:30 a.m. This case has been set for trial on February 21, 2006.
The parties shall advise the Court within 10 days from the date of this Order whether they desire
a second Settlement Conference before that time.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of December 2005.
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